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Abstract  
Most papers dealing with individual overeducation risks focus on labour supply characteristics and 
workers behaviour. On the other hand, only few studies consider labour demand characteristics and 
technological change. In this paper we analyse the influence of both demand and supply factors on 
educational mismatch in a set of ten European countries. Our hypothesis, confirmed by results 
obtained using ordered probit model with sample selection, is that demand factors generally play 
major role in reducing educational mismatch in technologically more advanced countries, whereas 
supply factors are more important in countries that are lagging behind in the international division of 
labour. At the same time, important cross-country and gender differences have been identified in the 
way the demand/supply factors operate. All this calls for the fine-tuning of policies aimed to tackle 
the problem of educational mismatch. Apparently, EPL does not appear neither to hinder 
technological development, nor increase overeducation.  
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Introduction 
 
The utmost utilization of human capital acquired by workers is a goal to be pursued by 
also removing the obstacles that hinder a proper match between educational qualifications 
obtained and job requirements.  
One can identify three possible statuses for a person: under-/ properly and overeducated. 
Most of the papers dealing with educational mismatch concentrate on the issue of overeducation. 
The main reason is that it can be thought as a waste of resources, especially in the wake of a 
rapidly growing supply of graduates. In this paper we do not intend to question the validity of 
expansionary education policies, rather we aim to provide a broader framework to understanding 
the observed outcomes. The reality is such that there are many more people who end up being 
under- or overeducated for the type of job performed. Our enquiry is not only about why this 
happens, but also which can be the ways to correct for it. In this respect it is very important to 
understand the channels through which the demand and supply forces operate, and moreover 
which of the two may prevail in different contexts.  
Our hypothesis is that countries which invest more in innovation and technologies should 
be able to make better use of the educated labour force. The demand factors aim to grasp this 
effect and are expected to play more important role in reducing the risk of overeducation in more 
technologically advanced countries. On the opposite, supply factors are expected to be the major 
cause for both under- and overeducation in countries lagging behind in terms of innovation and 
technologies.  
Testing this hypothesis was implemented in two stages. Firstly, the principal components 
analysis was employed to cluster countries making part of the EU-LFS data set. We then choose 
to reduce their number to ten, so that to cover different patterns of labour market regulation, 
degrees of technological intensity and the incidence of educational mismatch
1
. On a country 
basis, we further investigate the impact of selected demand and supply factors
2
 on the probability 
of being under-/properly or overeducated. For that purpose we estimate the ordered probit model 
with sample selection, separately for men and women.  
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 In particular, Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain are representative of low-to-middle technology and middle-to-high 
employment protection. The Czech Republic and Hungary have both relatively low technological level and 
employment protection. France and Germany appear as being in the middle, in terms of both technology and 
employment protection. The UK is known for low employment protection, coupled with high technological 
development. Finally, Finland leads the list for technology, despite middle employment protection. 
2
 On the demand side we consider such characteristics as youth unemployment rate (in order to measure the 
difficulties at the entry into the labour market for the new graduates) or expenditure per worker in research and 
development sector (used as a proxy of technological development), all at regional level. On the supply side, 
participation into lifelong learning and the field of education obtained. For more details see section 3. 
 3 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 provides a literature review and puts forward 
the hypothesis to be tested. Section 2 presents the criteria used in selecting the countries to 
analyze. Section 3 describes the data and methodology used for the analysis. Section 4 presents 
the empirical findings. Section 5 discusses the obtained results. The concluding remarks follow. 
 
1. Literature review and hypotheses to be tested 
The interest to the issue of educational mismatch is justified by the manifold negative 
consequences it may produce. Just to mention few of them, at micro level overeducation was 
found to produce the downward pressure on wages and productivity (see, amongst others, Bauer, 
2002; Di Pietro and Cutillo, 2006a, 2006b; Lindley and McIntosh, 2010) as well as on 
individuals’ job satisfaction (McGuinness and Sloane, 2009; Verhaest and Omey, 2008), at 
macro level it is associated to the waste of resources and the loss of efficiency (Budría and  
Moro-Egido, 2006)
3
.   
The growing number of studies which investigate the main causes of educational mismatch 
can broadly be divided in two groups, dealing with labour supply (workers behaviour) or 
otherwise labour demand characteristics (see Table 1).   
Table 1. Selected studies addressing different aspects of educational mismatch   
Labour Supply characteristics Labour Demand characteristics 
Individual 
heterogeneity 
Bauer, 2002; Chevalier, 2003; 
Frenette, 2004; McGuinness, 2003; 
McGuinness and Bennet, 2007;  
Green et al., 2002; McGuinness, 
2006; Ghignoni, 2012;  
Quintini, 2011a.  
Labour markets 
rigidities and 
employment 
protection legislation  
Mendes de Oliveira et al., 
2000; Di Pietro, 2002 
Quality of 
education 
Chevalier, 2003; Verhaest and Omey, 
2004; Di Pietro and Cutillo,  2006a; 
Ordine and Rose, 2009; 2011. 
Skill Biased Technical 
Change 
Albrecht and Vroman, 2002; 
Gottschalk and Hansen 2003; 
Dolado, Jansen and Jimeno, 
2009, Muysken and ter Weel, 
1999; Malchow-Møller and 
Skaksen, 2004; Cuadras-
Moratò and Mateos-Planas, 
2006, 2011. 
Spatial mobility  Büchel and Van Ham (2003),  
Croce and Ghignoni (2011) and 
Quinn and Rubb (2011) 
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 There are contrasting views though. Büchel, de Grip and Mertens (2004) in particular state that ‘Rather than an 
inefficiency, overeducation may even create a social benefit. If without this surplus education workers find it more 
difficult to find any employment and are more likely to be unemployed, overeducation may lead to savings in 
unemployment benefits and active labour market policies aimed at the insertion of workers in the labour market.’ 
We admit that some positive externalities may take place, but overall tend to see overeducation (and more generally 
educational mismatch) as a suboptimal outcome.  
 4 
 
Labour supply characteristics. Individual heterogeneity is taken into account by 
assuming that two persons possessing the same years of education or similar credentials could 
have different skills and/or ability levels. In this framework, some studies use models that allow 
for variability in workers skills by controlling for unobserved effects, i.e. skill differences across 
individuals with similar levels of education (Bauer, 2002; Chevalier, 2003; Frenette, 2004). 
Other authors introduce into the analysis explicit (self-assessed) measures of skills related to job 
performance (McGuinness, 2003; McGuinness and Bennet, 2007)
4
. Green et al. (2002) 
concentrate on mismatches between required and acquired skills as opposed to years of 
education or credentials. The same study highlights the importance of cohort-related effects (also 
due to grade drift
5
), which can potentially result in significant differences in skills and 
competencies across individuals with similar levels of education. Moreover, skills of workers 
with the same educational degree could be very dissimilar depending on the different specific 
experience and /or the different training to which they were exposed (McGuinness, 2006). Along 
this theoretical line, Ghignoni (2012) proposed a method of measuring overeducation that, 
starting from the idea of “frontier of competencies” by occupation, links the concept of 
overeducation to on-the-job experience. 
A different strand of literature highlighted the role of educational quality as a crucial 
element in determining overeducation. Chevalier (2003) argues that widening access to tertiary 
education has increased the heterogeneity of graduates through lower ability students accessing 
universities and an increase in student/teacher ratios. Verhaest and Omey (2004) tested the 
hypothesis that overeducation would compensate for a “bad” quality of education. Subsequently, 
Di Pietro and Cutillo (2006a) examined the effect of university quality on the early labour 
market outcomes of a cohort of recent Italian graduates. In a similar way, Ordine and Rose 
(2009; 2011), find a significant impact of educational quality on both overeducation risks and 
wage inequality among the college graduates. Regarding workers behaviour, Büchel and Van 
Ham (2003) see spatial mobility as a potential mean to avoid overeducation in German labour 
market. In the same line, Croce and Ghignoni (2011) and Quinn and Rubb (2011) developed the 
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 In this case McGuinness and Bennet (2007) utilised an explicit self-assessed subjective measure of skill based on 
the individual’s average competency across 16 areas (word-processing, spreadsheets, data management, knowledge 
of ITC packages, Internet use, corporate finance, product/process management, quality assurance, customer 
awareness, human resource management, corporate statutory requirements, interpersonal skills, leadership skills, 
organisational skills, team building). 
5
 The concept of grade drift describes a drop in educational standards implying that the level of human capital 
associated with various credentials has fallen over time and it will be evident if, ceteris paribus, employers are found 
to be increasing educational requirements for younger workers. Note, in this case a young worker possessing higher 
educational degree with respect to the one required to perform the job would not necessarily be overeducated. There 
is an evidence that a grade drift happened after the recent “3+2” University reform in Italy (see Bratti et al., 2007). 
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hypothesis that the risk of overeducation is highest for workers characterised by low 
migrating/commuting tolerance. 
Only few papers analyzed individual’s overeducation risks by focusing on labour demand 
characteristics and technological change. Most of them highlighted the role of institutional 
labour markets rigidities and employment protection legislation (EPL) (Mendes de Oliveira et 
al., 2000; Di Pietro, 2002). In particular, it is argued that the rapid pace of technological change 
may require school-provided skills higher than those possessed by currently employed workers. 
In less flexible labour market settings, firing restrictions may discourage firms to immediately 
upgrade the level of the “old” workforce in response to rapid changes in technologies (even in 
the presence of upward changes in skilled workforce availability). At the same time, firms 
upgrade their “new” hiring standards and recently hired employees, with higher educational 
qualifications than their older co-workers, are perceived (Mendes de Oliveira et al., 2000) or 
perceive themselves (Di Pietro, 2002) to be overeducated.  
Moreover, firing restrictions may discourage firms from adopting new technologies and 
from undertaking R&D, thus reducing the number of vacancies that can be filled with highly 
skilled workers in the medium/long run (Di Pietro, 2002). 
Neither of these papers provides strong direct evidence about the relation between EPL, 
technological change and overeducation. 
Mendes de Oliveira et al. (2000) tested the hypothesis that (young) overeducated workers 
undergo more firm-specific training than (old) non-overeducated ones, and this allows meeting 
the needs of employer willing to upgrade the production technology. Unfortunately, their 
analysis is limited to Portugal and failed to compare countries with different levels of EPL. 
On the other hand, Di Pietro (2002) compares 11 countries (with different degrees of labour 
market flexibility) and shows that strict rules against collective dismissals increase the incidence 
of overeducation. Nevertheless the analysis does not include any technological variable. 
We here identify 3 critical points in this theoretical framework: 
1. If newly hired workers have been chosen on the basis of a higher educational level due 
to jobs technological upgrade, they can perceive themselves as overeducated, but probably they 
are not “genuine” overeducated (Chevalier and Lindley, 2009). In this case it would be important 
to verify whether the higher educational level of newly hired workers has been driven by the 
necessity that workers could manage technological and organizational changes (“demand 
effect”), or if it is the result of a simple “supply effect” and labour demand is just drawing newly 
hired workers from a population where high educated individuals are becoming more numerous.  
2. A large number of economic models in the literature provides a foundation for Skill 
Biased Technical Change (SBTC) (see e.g. Acemoglu, 2002; Aghion, 2002; Hornstein et al., 
 6 
2005). In particular, they contend that more educated, able or experienced workers deal better 
with technological change. Skilled workers are less adversely affected by the turmoil created by 
major technological transformations, since it is less costly for them to learn the additional 
knowledge needed to adopt a new technology (Nelson and Phelps, 1966). Then, in the early 
adoption phase of a new technology those who adapt more quickly can reap some benefits. As 
time goes by, there will be enough workers learning how to work with the new technology to 
offset the wage differential. In countries characterized by higher aggregate human capital in the 
(old and young) labour force and by a higher level of lifelong learning (LLL) (especially among 
the older population) firms would not have to lay off older people to implement technological 
innovations, and the diffusion of technological changes should be fairly independent from the 
strictness of EPL. 
3. According to Endogenous SBTC (Acemoglu, 1998), the expansion of educated labour 
over the post-war period made it profitable to develop machines complementary to skilled 
workers. If supply creates its own demand, firms may have incentives to undertake R&D and to 
adopt new technologies in countries characterised by higher aggregate human capital and LLL. 
In this case even high levels of EPL would not prevent intensifying R&D and, from this point of 
view, it should not be thought as a factor that may increase overeducation.  
A more promising strand of literature which analyses the impact of labour demand 
characteristics and technological change on overeducation just focuses on the role of SBTC. 
Some of the recent studies claim that SBTC might work in the direction of reducing 
overeducation (Albrecht and Vroman, 2002; Gottschalk and Hansen 2003; Dolado, Jansen and 
Jimeno, 2009), others instead claim that it would increase overeducation (see e.g. Muysken and 
ter Weel, 1999; Malchow-Møller and Skaksen, 2004; Cuadras-Moratò and Mateos-Planas, 2006, 
2011).  
- In particular, Cuadras-Moratò and Mateos-Planas (2011) state that “following a SBTC, 
firms searching for educated workers become more selective in their hiring policies, rejecting 
candidates who, in spite of their credentials, turn out to be poorly skilled. Low ability educated 
workers will then seek employment in jobs that do not require a qualification and become 
overeducated”. In the same line, Muysken and ter Weel (1999), point out that in the presence of 
SBTC low educated workers will be crowded out of the labour market (thus explaining the rise 
in unemployment among low educated workers in most European countries), while the bumping 
down of high educated workers would explain overeducation. Both papers are better fit to 
explain the effects of the increasing supply of educated workers than the effects of the increasing 
demand for educated workers and/or the “qualitative change in the composition of jobs” 
entrained by the SBTC (Acemoglu, 1999). 
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- Other studies suggest that the SBTC should cause overeducation to reduce. The main 
idea is that educated/skilled workers become more likely to refuse low quality jobs and wait until 
they find a better one. In particular, according to Albrecht and Vroman (2002), if the relative 
demand shift due to SBTC is large enough, it can trigger a switch to an “ex-post segmentation 
equilibrium” in which high-skilled workers only take up high-skill jobs. More recently, Dolado 
et al. (2009) enlarge Albrecht and Vroman’s model by allowing mismatched workers to keep the 
option of moving to better jobs through on-the-job search. The introduction of this option 
reduces the opportunity cost of mismatch for the highly-educated workers and, under the 
hypothesis of relative labour demand shift, leads to job-to-job transitions. Finally, Gottschalk and 
Hansen (2003), state that college-educated workers will flow out of non-college jobs as they are 
attracted by the increased wages in college jobs caused by the SBTC.  
In this theoretical framework, we formulate the following hypotheses to be tested: 
1. In countries characterised by high aggregate human capital, firms have an incentive to 
undertake R&D and to adopt new technologies. In such context EPL would not play a critical 
role. 
2. The adoption of new technologies produces a relative demand shift which favours highly 
educated workers 
6
 and reduces overeducation.  
3. Supply side factors are instead more efficient in balancing the educational mismatch in 
countries with lower levels of technological development. 
The first hypothesis is verified by a principal components analysis reported in section 2, 
which is also used to choose countries representative of different patterns of labour market 
regulation/ technological development. In order to test the hypotheses 2 and 3, which are central 
to the paper, we then estimate the effects of demand and supply factors on the individual risks of 
educational mismatch as will be explained in section 3. 
 
2. The choice of countries 
The choice of countries was made on the basis of a clustering exercise, bases on principal 
components analysis, which takes into account some indicators of technology, aggregate human 
capital and employment protection, as presented in Figure 1.  
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 This hypothesis is not fully shared in the economic literature. Indeed, Weiss (2008) presents a model in which 
SBTC does not always lead to increasing demand for skilled labour and to increasing wage inequality. According to 
this author, if there are complementarities between goods that do not benefit greatly from technological innovations 
and goods whose production costs fall in the course of technical progress, the relative price of these “low-tech” 
goods rises. If the production of “low-tech” goods is intensive in the use of unskilled labour, unskilled workers 
benefit from this increase in the relative goods price. Nevertheless, most of the literature agrees with Funk and 
Vogel (2004) who assume that (for the production technologies known at any given point in time) physical capital is 
a closer substitute for unskilled labor than for skilled labour, and show that technical change is rarely biased in favor 
of the unskilled and often against them. 
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- For Technology and Aggregate Human Capital dimensions we rely on statistics available 
from the Eurostat online database (at country level), including: the number of high-tech patents 
applications to the EPO
7
 (Pat), Expenditure per worker in R&D sector (R&D), the share of 
ISCED 5 and 6 graduates among the working age population (HC), and the share of population 
participating in lifelong learning activities (LLL).   
- For Employment Protection we rely on the summary indicator of the Strictness of 
employment protection legislation (henceforth EPL) calculated by OECD and available (at 
country level) for the year 2003
8
 (OECD 2004: Tab. 2.A.2.4, p. 117).  
In addition to that we consider the Share of temporary workers (Temp) among the 
employed population as well as the indicator of State intervention in the labour market, such as  
expenditure on labour market policies in percentage of GDP (LMP_GDP) (Eurostat online 
database). 
The first factorial axis in Figure 1 shows, on its positive side, a high correlation with a 
strong labour market regulation (EPL) and the percentage of temporary contracts
9
. The second 
factorial axis shows, on the positive semi-axis, a strong correlation with technology and human 
capital indicators. There appears to be no clear relation between employment protection and 
technological development. Countries are distributed between the four quadrants, and technology 
variables (Pat and R&D) seem to be more tied to aggregate human capital (HC) and LLL than to 
EPL and labour market flexibility. In particular, in Mediterranean countries high EPL is coupled 
with low “technology”, whereas Scandinavian countries are characterized by medium levels of 
employment protection and yet high levels of technology development. In the same way, the UK 
and Ireland have a very low level of employment protection but they are characterized by a 
significantly lower technological dimension than Scandinavian countries (in particular, Finland). 
Note also that the high R&D spending (per worker) does not necessarily imply the high 
number of patents applications to the EPO. R&D expenditure per worker in Finland is lower than 
in Italy and in Portugal (Table A.1). Nevertheless, Finland enjoys the highest number of EPO 
patents, whereas Italy and Portugal lag far behind. This could be a sign of the lack of efficiency 
of R&D spending. In fact, there is much cross-country variation in this respect (Conte, 2009). 
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 EPO - European Patent Office. 
8
 We take the version of this indicator which accounts for Regular employment, Temporary employment and 
Collective dismissals. 
9
 Note that EPL and the share of temporary contracts could be correlated. Indeed, according to Engellandt and 
Riphahn (2005), countries characterised by limited employment protection (for permanent and temporary workers) 
would use temporary contract mainly as a screening device. By contrast, countries characterised by stronger 
protection would need to use temporary contract also as a cyclical buffer. Eurostat data seem to confirm this 
intuition. In 2003 EPL for permanent and temporary contracts in Spain was, respectively, 2.6 and 3.5. The same 
index for UK was 1.1 and 0.4. At the same time, the percentage of temporary contracts in Spain reached 31.7% of 
population aged 15 or more, whereas in the UK the share of temps was only 6.1%. 
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Since we assume that technological development goes in the direction of reducing 
overeducation, our preliminary findings are not supportive to those reported by Di Pietro (2002), 
who sustains that imposing rules against collective dismissals discourages firms from 
undertaking R&D/adopting new technologies and increases the incidence of overeducation. 
 
Figure 1. Principal components analysis: Technology and Employment protection  
 
Note: the arrows indicate the direction in which the variables affect the positioning of the country on the graph. 
Source: own calculation on Eurostat online database and OECD indicators, as described above. 
 
The data used for the principal components analysis, together with the percentages of 
overeducated by country, are reported in Table A.1 of the Appendix and provide further insight 
on this issue. Apparently, the incidence of overeducation is as high in Greece, Spain and Italy 
(high EPL), as in Ireland, the UK and Hungary (low EPL). On the other side, overeducation is 
very low in Denmark (low EPL), Austria, Sweden, the Netherlands and Germany (medium-high 
EPL) and in Portugal (very high EPL). 
In what follows we choose to concentrate on the following countries: Italy, Greece, 
Portugal, Spain, the Czech Republic, Hungary, France, Germany, Finland, and the UK, 
representing a different mixture of Technology/EPL as in Figure 1
10
. 
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 The choice of countries was also driven by data availability, e.g. Finland is the only Scandinavian country for 
which regional data was available at NUTS 2 level.   
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3. Data and methodology used for the analysis 
The analysis is based on the EU Labour Force Survey 2003 and an ad hoc module on 
lifelong learning for the same year. The definition of key variables is provided in Table A.2 of 
the Appendix, followed by descriptive statistics (Table A.3). 
Dependent variable and modeling strategy 
In this paper we concentrate on educational qualifications mismatch only
11
 and consider three 
possible statuses for a person: under-/properly and overeducated. This way we do not only look 
at what explains the very fact of being under-/overeducated or not, but allow for the co- 
existence of cases with proper match.  
Three main alternatives are known in economic literature to measure the minimum requested 
education and under-/overeducation. 
1. The objective measure. Professional job analysts identify the required level and type of 
education in a particular occupation and this way place an occupation into a requirement 
ranking. For example, the US Employment Service compiles the Dictionary of Occupation 
Titles (DOT), similar to the Standard Occupational Classification System (SOCS) in the 
UK. These classifications are then converted into years of requested schooling or schooling 
dummies which can be compared with the acquired schooling of the individuals in the 
study (Rumberger, 1987). 
2. The subjective measure: This approach relies on worker’s self-assessment. It resorts to a  
survey asking which level of education is required to get (Duncan and Hoffman, 1981) or 
to do (Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1988) their job. Once again this (classified) information can 
be compared with the actual schooling of the individual. 
3. The empirical measure: This approach uses the distribution of schooling years in a given 
occupation or a group of occupations. Most commonly, individuals are defined to be 
overeducated if their schooling level is more than one standard deviation above the mean 
(Verdugo and Verdugo, 1988) or mode (Kiker et al., 1997) of all individuals in that 
occupation. 
We here rely on the empirical measure
12
. The dependent variable takes value ‘1’, which 
corresponds to undereducation, if the highest level of education achieved (measured in full years) 
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 Some of the most recent papers moreover consider the join problem of educational qualifications and skill 
mismatch (see for instance Quintini 2011a). We do admit the importance of this comprehensive approach, but at the 
same time understand the related risks. In particular, the subjective (worker’s) evaluation data which is generally 
used to identify the discrepancy between the possessed and required skills can be subject to an error. Thus adhering 
to educational qualifications can be rewarding.  
12
 The choice of empirical as opposed to normative or self-assessed measures proposed in the literature (for a recent 
survey see Quintini 2011b) was dictated by data availability. 
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is lower than the mode
13
 for the occupation (at ISCO 2-digit). Value ‘2’ stands for a proper 
match, i.e. when the years of education are exactly the same as the mode. ‘3’ stands for 
overeducation, when the years of education are higher than the mode for the occupation. For 
descriptive statistics by country see Table A.2 in the Appendix.  
The type of the dependent variable used for the analysis justifies the choice of an ordered 
probit setting. Assume the following model, where yi
* 
is a latent variable, unobserved measure of 
educational (mis)match.  
yi
*
=xiβ +εi,    εi |xi ~
iid 
N(0,1)  
              1, if yi
*  ≤ α1 
yi  =       2, if α1 <yi
*  ≤ α2 
              3, if yi
*  > α2 
The set of explanatory variables xi includes both demand and supply factors, as described 
below. The estimated coefficients should be interpreted as increasing the risk of 
overeducation/reducing the probability of undereducation if they are positive, and the other way 
around. Note that the marginal effects do not always coincide with the sign of the estimated 
coefficients. The marginal effects for the three outcomes of interest will thus be reported 
alongside to the estimated coefficients (Tables A.4.1-A.4.10). 
Demand and supply factors 
The demand factors are drawn primarily from the Eurostat online database and are defined 
at the regional level (NUTS 2). These include: 1) patents applications to the EPO; 2) expenditure 
per worker in research and development sector; 3) gross fixed capital formation per person
14
; 4) 
youth unemployment rate. In addition to that we calculate 5) the share of ISCO 1, 2 and 3 among 
the working population, by region, using EU-LFS 2003 data. For the first three indicators we 
used the average value over the years 2000-2003 in order to account for lagged effects. 
The supply factors are represented by individual characteristics, such as age, marital status, 
level of the highest education obtained, the field of education, working conditions (type of 
                                                 
13
 We used a mode-based criterion since, as argued by Mendes de Oliveira et al. (2000), it is “less sensitive to the 
presence of outliers in the data and provides a more accurate measure of the extent of surplus or deficit schooling 
than can be garnered from the mean”. 
14
 The final choice of demand factors was made after careful examination of other pieces of data that can be 
informative about the way local labour markets operate, including e.g.: human resources in science and technology 
as percentage of the working population, long-term unemployment rate, the share of highly educated among the 
employed/active population (for other viable alternatives see Science and Technology report by the Eurostat 2011). 
Eventually we had to restrict the number of explanatory variables in order to avoid strong correlation between them. 
Some of them are used interchangeably in the output tables (A.4.1-A.4.10).   
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contract, firm size), occupation, the index of participation into LLL
15
, and a spatial mobility 
indicator.  
Note that the combined use of data at regional and individual levels may be a reason of 
biased standard errors as illustrated by Moulton (1990). In what follows we thus report cluster 
adjusted standard errors. 
The issue of sample selection bias  
Since educational (mis)match can only be observed for working population, there is an 
issue of sample selection bias (Heckman, 1979). We account for it by implementing sample 
selection correction procedure
16
. Moreover we perform estimates separately for men and women 
in order to account for differences in their labour force participation.   
The instrumental variable used is ‘Live_alone’17 or, in alternative, ‘Young_children’ (for 
definition see Table A.2). We assume that the person who declares to be living alone would most 
probably have to rely on incomes from paid work and this should increase the probability for 
him/her to be employed. At the same time, there are no evident reasons for why the educational 
match of a person living alone should be different from a person living in a numerous household. 
In turn, since the presence of children negatively affects female participation in the labour 
market (Dolton and Vignoles, 2000), whereas it provides incentives for male participation (Di 
Pietro and Cutillo, 2006b), this variable is a suitable selection variable when the analysis is 
disaggregated by gender. The quality and the validity of the instruments have been ascertained 
(for details see Appendix B).  
 
4. Empirical findings  
 
We first calculate the incidence of educational mismatch by country, differently for men 
and women, as reported in Table 2. 
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 The construction of this index is based on (on-line and off-line) self-studying activities and on libraries and 
learning centers visiting. These activities appear to be primarily related to an individual choice. For this reason we 
interpret the LLL index as a measure of individual heterogeneity (such as ability, talent, and, in particular, 
aspirations and motivations). 
16 
We first estimate the participation equation (where the dependent variable is a dummy for working/not working) 
and then use the obtained inverse Mills ratio as an entry into the main equation (where the dependent variable is 
defined as educational (mis)match). 
17
 This variable could not be constructed in the case of Finland since information about family relations had been 
suppressed in the available release of data.  
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Table 2. The incidence of over-/undereducation, by country 
Country Undereducated 
         Men             Women 
Overeducated 
         Men            Women 
Total educational mismatch 
          Men                   Women 
 1                          2  3                       4           1+3                       2+4 
Italy 24.7 32.8 21.3 18.4 46 51.2 
Greece 21.8 25.6 26.8 15.0 48.6 40.6 
Portugal 16.6 18.9  16.11 14.8 32.71 33.7 
Spain 33.3 27.8 23.2 24.0 56.5 51.8 
Czech Republic 17.8 25.6 17.4 12.7 35.2 38.3 
Hungary 19.9 24.9  23.6 19.8 43.5 44.7 
France 44.9 41.4 11.2 17.6 56.1 59 
Germany 18.8 21.5 15.6 11.8 34.4 33.3 
Finland 39.4 37.9 10.3 14.5 49.7 52.4 
United Kingdom 40.6 43.7 19.1 20.5 59.7 64.2 
Source: own calculation on EU-LFS 2003. 
Finland, France and the United Kingdom show the highest rates of undereducation coupled 
with relatively low overeducation rates – something to be expected in the context of 
technologically advanced and fast developing economies. The Mediterranean countries instead 
are characterized by higher than average both under- and overeducation rates revealing the 
inefficacy of the educational systems therein not able to meet the needs of the economies.  
The two East European countries considered, the Czech Republic and Hungary, both show 
asymmetry in the rates of under-/overeducation by gender: male overeducation rates are higher 
than female rates, while undereducation on the opposite hits more women. This pattern is also 
confirmed for Mediterranean countries, except for Spain, suggesting that the gender breakdown 
is particularly important for these two groups of economies.  
Germany and Portugal have the lowest rates of overeducation (and total educational 
mismatch), for different reasons though. Germany is characterized by high average educational 
attainments, with 29% of the sample considered possessing high level of education and 58% - 
medium (see Table A.3 in the Appendix). The good match can thus be a sign of a well 
functioning educational system adapted to the needs of the national labour market. Portugal 
instead is characterized by very low educational attainments with 89% of the sample considered 
reporting low levels of education. High education there remains a kind of luxury, and the few 
ones who manage to get access to it fit well into the labour market after the completion of 
studies. Those who possess low degree also seem to be placed well. The framework is thus 
completely different: the economy seems to not create enough incentives but also opportunities 
for people to invest into education, whereby low educational mismatch can be explained by low 
educational production. 
The above results are consistent with those obtained in a recent study by Croce and 
Ghignoni (2012)
18
 who analyze the evolution of the incidence of overeducation in 26 European 
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 This study uses both mean and modal measures of overeducation, focusing on university graduates only. 
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countries over an extended period of time (1998-2006) relying on the same EU-LFS data. 
According to this study, Mediterranean countries not only are characterized by high incidence of 
overeducation (except for Portugal), but also exhibit an increasing trend during the time span 
considered (including Portugal). France, Germany, Finland and UK are characterized by a low 
incidence of overeducation, but the trends for them differ: increasing for France and Finland, and 
declining for Germany and the UK. Even the Czech Republic and Hungary would be 
characterized by a high level of (modal-based)
19 
overeducation and by a slightly increasing trend 
over the period. 
Further analysis aims to explore more in detail what is behind these cross-country 
differences in educational mismatch. We thus proceed by estimating the ordered probit model, as 
explained in the previous section, taking into account the issue of sample selection bias. Tables 
A.4.1-A.4.10 in the Appendix report the estimates by country.   
The first thing to note is that the joint effect of demand factors does not exceed the joint 
effect of supply factors. Nevertheless, the significance of these effects varies. For Italy and 
Greece the demand side counts very little in reducing educational mismatch, while it is more 
influential in countries like Germany and Finland. This is in line with the hypothesis we put 
forward at the beginning of the paper, namely that demand is more effective in technologically 
advanced countries. Note, moreover, that in some countries, in particular Portugal, men are more 
responsive to the demand factors, while in others, apparently the United Kingdom, the same 
holds true for women.  
There is no single factor on the demand side which would appear to be significant 
throughout the countries, suggesting that there may be no universal cure for the educational 
mismatch. Patents applications (used here as a proxy for the efficiency of R&D sector), cause 
overeducation to reduce in Portugal, Spain (only for women) and Germany (for both men and 
women). If moreover we look at the marginal effects, it tends to increase the probability of being 
properly matched (as in Finland).  
The interpretation of the coefficient for the youth unemployment rate is not 
straightforward. In some cases it tends to decrease the probability of overeducation. This is 
possible in case, rather than accepting the job which does not correspond to the level of 
education achieved, a young person prefers to be unemployed (this holds true for men in Spain 
and women in the UK). But there are also cases when it has positive and significant coefficient, 
meaning that higher youth unemployment rates are associated with higher educational mismatch. 
This is revealing of the pressure that is often felt in the labour market, pushing young people to 
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 In the case of the Czech Republic and Hungary the average and the modal measures of overeducation provide 
significantly different results. For the other countries the two measures provide much more similar results. 
 15 
accept any type of job, even if not appropriate to the level of his/her education (this holds true for 
men in Portugal, France and Hungary, less so for both men and women in Germany)
20
. The 
positive effect nevertheless prevails, which highlights the need to facilitate school-to-work 
transitions in most European countries. 
The gross fixed capital formation has the expected negative and significant coefficients for 
Spain, France and the Czech Republic. In most of the other countries, albeit negative, it does not 
appear to be significant. This may be a sign of inefficient investments into fixed capital, which 
gets even worse in case of Portugal, where the coefficient is positive and significant. It has 
nevertheless positive effect on labour market participation in both of the Eastern European 
countries considered, as well as in France and Finland.  
We also found that increasing expenditure in R&D sector does not help overcoming the 
problem of educational mismatch. At best it allows reducing undereducation, as in Finland. In 
Hungary and Portugal it works in the direction of reducing overeducation but only partially, for 
women, while increasing undereducation. In no other country it appears to be statistically 
significant. Probably, this can be taken as a sign of lack of efficiency of spending in R&D. 
The variable ISCO123 was used to check the relevance of the SBTC hypothesis. In 
particular, the higher percentage of top occupations among the working population means higher 
needs for educated labour force. In case it associates to lower/higher rates of educational 
mismatch, SBTC causes educational mismatch to reduce/increase. The empirical findings are 
partly supportive to this hypothesis. In most of the countries for which the variable appears to be 
significant (including Germany, Hungary, Finland, the UK and Portugal for men only) the 
marginal effects are positive for undereducation and negative for overeducation, suggesting that 
SBTC tends to increase the risk of undereducation while reducing the risk of overeducation.  
On the supply side, age counts. In about half of the countries considered the risk of 
overeducation tends to increase with age, while undereducation tends to reduce. This is true for 
Germany, Spain and men in the Czech Republic, Hungary and the UK. In Italy and Greece, on 
the opposite, the risk of overeducation is higher for younger workers, while undereducation is 
lower for them. This identifies the young cohorts as being most exposed to the waste of human 
capital in the Italian and Greek contexts. 
The counterbalancing factor appears to be individual participation into LLL. It tends to 
reduce, in a statistically significant way, the risk of overeducation in all of the countries 
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 In this framework, some authors (Rice, 1999,  for the UK, and  Giannelli and Monfardini, 2003, for Italy) argue 
that unemployment reduces the opportunity cost of education and therefore increases the probability that a young 
person is studying, rather than searching for a job (or accepting a job below his/her expectations). By contrast, 
Pastore (2005), focusing on a sample of young Poles, finds that high unemployment regions provide a disincentive 
to further education, and an incentive for job search for young people in Central and Eastern European countries. 
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considered for which the index of participation into LLL could be constructed
21
. It may thus be 
an important complement to formal education and an indicator of individual motivation. The 
latter is an important characteristic of individual heterogeneity. In fact, not that the type of skills 
acquired by means of LLL are ‘sold’ at the market (components of LLL index are described in 
Tab.A2), rather they enhance the employability of a person as well as the chances to be properly 
matched. Our results also show that participation into LLL is associated to higher risk of 
undereducation. All together this would suggest that individual motivation to invest in informal 
training after leaving formal education can help people with a low level of schooling to stay in 
employment, whereas it can favour movements along career paths for those possessing a high 
level of education
22
.  
The choice of education field appears to be crucial for both males and females in all 
countries. At the same time there are fields of education which serve expanding sectors and thus 
are able to reduce overeducation but sustain high rates of undereducation (e.g. Science, Health 
and Education). Engineering remains “male-friendly” in that it allows men to find a better match, 
less so for women. 
In some countries, including Portugal and Spain but also Finland, men appear to be more 
responsive to the demand factors, compared to women. Moreover, it is worth noticing that in the 
UK (and to a lesser extent in France) the number of patents applications seems to increase 
overeducation and educational mismatch for women (but not for men).  
Overall, the supply factors play an important role for both increasing participation and 
reducing overeducation, whereas the demand factors considered are more effective in pushing up 
participation rather than reducing educational mismatch. 
Finally, we also perform the estimates without correcting for sample selection for those 
countries where it has not been found (for men or women, or both). This allows incorporating 
some additional variables of interest, in particular: the size of the firm (dummy for small firm), 
part-time worker, temporary contract and mover (see Table A.5 in the Appendix). 
Working for a small firm tends to increase the risk of overeducation/reduce the risk of 
undereducation. This is in line with existing findings (Dolton and Silles, 2001) and our 
expectations. In fact as long as the size of the firm gets larger the recruitment procedures tend to 
be more formalized. Moreover, there is more space for career advancement, which renders 
underutilization of human capital less probable. On the opposite, small firms have less 
possibilities for on-the-job specific training, thus the employer’s forward looking behavior would 
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 This data was not available for the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom. 
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 Robinson (2009) in fact argues that lifelong learning is a response to over-education rather than under-education 
necessary for a knowledge society. 
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preclude the recruitment of a person which is undereducated. It holds true for men in Portugal, 
Hungary, France and Germany, as well as for women in Finland, Hungary and France.  
The effects of part-time and temporary contracts are not univocal. Being on part-time has 
practically no effect on men, also because it is less common among men (see Tab. A3). At the 
same time it tends to considerably increase the risk of overeducation for women. The reason is 
that part-time is often a solution for women with children, who have less bargaining power. Thus 
there is more possibility that  employers will be setting higher requirements for entry into job 
(with no big costs implied), giving rise to overeducation. 
On the opposite, temporary contracts have less of an impact for women, while they have 
important consequences for men: increasing overeducation/reducing undereducation in Hungary 
and France, and quite the opposite in Germany and Finland. Importantly, they also tend to 
considerably reduce the probability of being well-matched in the case of men (except for 
France). These results point out that the hypothesis of an “exchange” between “good match” and 
“security” of jobs is not always confirmed. Similar results were obtained by Croce and Ghignoni 
(2012). 
Finally, we check for the effect of spatial mobility. Indeed, an increasing literature 
recognizes that overeducation can arise when workers dislike or are prevented from the 
geographical mobility needed to search for a suitable job if demand and supply of skills do not 
have a homogeneous spatial distribution (see, amongst others, Büchel and van Ham, 2003; Croce 
and Ghignoni, 2011). According to our results, commuting allows reducing the probability of 
being overeducated, while increasing the probability of being undereducated, but the effect is 
statistically significant in few countries only, for men and women in France and for women in 
Portugal.  
These findings raise an issue of an optimal mix of educational and labour market policies 
to counter the problem of educational mismatch; they will differ for men and women, and among 
countries. 
 
5. Discussion 
The general context, including the way educational systems (supply side) and labour 
markets (demand side) operate, may shed some light on our understanding of the revealed cross-
country differences.  
What counts for the outcome of interest (probability of educational mismatch), is how 
easy/difficult it is to get higher levels of education, whereby there is a risk of overeducation/ 
undereducation. The share of ISCED 5 and 6 graduates among the working age population, 
which has been used for the empirical analysis, is one of the characteristics of the actual 
 18 
outcome, in turn it can be influenced e.g. by the possibility for parents to choose a public versus 
private school for their children at all levels of education, by the financial 
incentives/disincentives for school choice (such as school vouchers and/or tuition tax credits 
available to help families offset the costs of private schooling), by the share of public versus 
private universities, by access to credit for students, and, more generally, by all types of public 
subsidies for education provided by national and local governments. 
None of the ten European countries considered in this study is characterized by too tight 
conditions to access higher education (with the partial exception of Portugal) (OECD 2010), 
nevertheless, the percentage of ISCED 5 and 6 graduates among the working age population 
varies a lot (Table A.1). 
The inflow of graduates can also be affected by the stimulus that the labour market creates 
in the form of private returns to education and the way school-to-work transitions operate. 
By comparing Table A.1 with Table A.6, one can see that the aggregate human capital is 
higher in those countries in which youth unemployment rate and the duration of school-to-work 
transitions are lower (in particular, Germany and the UK). On the other hand, high returns to 
education may provide an incentive to continue studying. In practice, however, the economic 
incentive to education can be neutralized by the lack of public subsidies for needy students, 
which seem to be the case of Portugal. The facilitated access to education, revealed by the high 
share of tertiary graduates among the working age population, theoretically might affect the 
probability of overeducation. In this framework, very low aggregate human capital (as compared 
to other European countries), can be one of the explanations for the low level of overeducation in 
Portugal (see Table A.l). In other countries, characteristics other than the "quantity" of aggregate 
human capital matter. Indeed, economic literature often rejected the hypothesis that the increase 
of the supply of skilled labour per se can be seen as a relevant factor fuelling overeducation
23
 
(Croce and Ghignoni, 2012). In this paper we thus investigate the role of other factors 
influencing educational mismatch. 
In particular, despite formal education remains the most important stage of the education 
process, there is an increasing role of non-formal education, including LLL. In this respect too 
there is much heterogeneity among countries. The share of population participating into LLL 
activities (Table A.l) ranges from 1.8% in Greece to more than 23% in Finland. As shown by our 
estimation results (Tables A.4.1-A.4.10), participation into LLL is essential for reducing 
overeducation. At the same time, it operates at different scales depending on how much the 
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 The educational expansion per se cannot be considered a major factor influencing overeducation, but as long as 
long as poorer quality individuals enter the labour market it may cause a "grade drift". 
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country invests in cultural infrastructure (by that we mean e.g. libraries and internet supported 
computer labs).  
Another important worker's characteristic which affects the risk of educational mismatch is 
the field of education obtained. In Mediterranean countries Engineering attracts 18% of students 
at most (the figure stands for Italy) compared to about 30% of students in Western European 
countries considered and more than 40% of students in Eastern European countries considered 
(see Table A.6)
24
. At the same time, Humanities, Languages and Arts together with Social 
Sciences attract almost half of the graduates in Italy. This is an additional explanation as to why 
Italian high education graduates have difficulties to face labour demand becoming ever more 
sophisticated. As a result the country features one of the highest rates of both under- and 
overeducation among workers (Table 2). Few in numbers
25
 and yet misplaced, as rightly 
emphasized in Franzini and Raitano (2009). These facts are difficult to reconcile and are 
revealing of the deficiencies in the way the labour market and the educational system operate.  
Italy (as other Mediterranean countries) is also known for one of the highest youth 
unemployment rates and lacking opportunities for young people at the start of career, thus 
difficult school-to-work transition (see Table A.6). This process is much facilitated in countries 
like Germany, and to some extent Finland and France, where the "dual" education system 
operates
26
. Despite the high aggregate human capital, these three countries are characterized by 
relatively low incidence of overeducation. At the same time, Germany, Finland and France are 
characterized by high rates of undereducation. These results can be explained by the widespread 
use of apprenticeship. Indeed, apprenticeship can improve workers screening by allowing 
employers to discover qualities and innate individual attributes of future employees, and by 
providing employees with work-related skills and competences, besides their formal degree of 
education (Ryan, 1998). In this case employers may get convinced that some workers are fully 
qualified to perform a specific job, for which they could appear to be formally undereducated. At 
the same time the better knowledge of workers' characteristics would also improve the match of 
individuals with a high educational degree. 
Other factors influencing the educational mismatch reside in the demand side of the 
market, namely, in labour market characteristics and the level of technological development. 
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  As reported by Walker and Zhu (2005) graduates in engineering are less likely to be overeducated, thus they can 
be regarded as a valid control in order to take into account the distribution of tertiary graduates by fields of 
education. 
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 Only 10.7% of the working age population in Italy possess university degree, see Table A.1. 
26
 The "Dual Education System" combines apprenticeships within a firm and vocational education at a vocational 
school. In the firm, the apprentice receives practical training which is supplemented by theoretical education in the 
vocational school. 
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The empirical analysis showed that the demand factors played minor role in determining 
educational mismatch. Their potential for reducing educational mismatch is expected to further 
weaken over the crisis, so there may be little space for policy interventions. Yet the effects of 
demand factors were found to be higher in technologically advanced countries and can possibly 
be amplified also in other contexts e.g. by increasing expenditure on/ improving the efficiency of 
research and development. This goal has been pursued by the majority of the European countries. 
Nevertheless, they rank lower in terms of research intensity (expenditure on R&D as a 
percentage of GDP) compared to the USA or Japan, as well as in terms of the real output 
(measured by patents applications to the EPO)
27
. 
Finland is an interesting case in point. It often appears at the top of the ranking in Science 
and Technology Report (ibidem), moreover has the highest share of ISCED 5 and 6 graduates 
among the working population and at the same time the lowest share of overeducated workers 
(see Table 2). What makes it possible? 
The well-known fact is that the higher the efficiency of research, the more investment it is 
going to attract. In turn the efficiency of research is largely determined by a proper mixture of 
fundamental and applied research. Some countries are known for achievement in applied 
research (e.g. the US), while others are more successful is pursuing fundamental research (e.g. 
France). Fundamental (mainly state financed) research on its own does not bring about 
technological growth. It is in combination with applied research (mainly financed by enterprises) 
that the result of interest is achieved. Only three EU Member States reached the goal set by the 
Lisbon strategy of having two thirds of the R&D expenditure financed by the business enterprise 
sector: Luxembourg (76.0%), Finland (70.3%) and Germany (67.9%) (Eurostat 2011). Finland 
again features as a country with an optimal mix of public and private spending on R&D. 
Additional insight may be drawn from the general setting. The Scandinavian economic 
model places Sweden, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands all at the top of the Technology 
axis in Figure 1. Alongside the flexicurity nexus it also implies the whole range of active and 
passive labour market policies. Moreover these countries are known for large investments into 
human capital, from the point of view of both quantity and quality
28
. All this is expected to 
create a self-sustaining mechanism of human capital production and utilization resulting in the 
low incidence of overeducation. 
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 On average, European countries spend 1.9% of GDP on R&D (in 2009), which is lower compared to a 3% goal 
set by the Lisbon strategy for 2010. Out of the countries considered only Finland has overcome the 3% mark of GDP 
spent on R&D, Germany was above the EU-average, and the rest of the countries considered lag behind. The output, 
measured in terms of patents applications to the EPO, is also relatively modest compared to the world leaders, again 
the USA and Japan. Nevertheless, in terms of the number of patents per million of inhabitants some countries, 
including Germany, Sweden and Finland, outperform even the world leaders (Eurostat 2011). 
28
 The evidence can be drawn from PISA scores reported in Tab. A6. Finland has the highest level out of the ten 
countries considered.  
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Another remarkable feature of  Scandinavian labour markets is the high female labour force 
participation. For Mediterranean countries instead it remains a policy objective, and the main 
way used to achieve it is increasing the educational attainments of women.  
While entering the labour market women nevertheless are more exposed to overeducation 
compared to men, at least this holds true for countries where female participation is high (France, 
Finland and the United Kingdom). Instead, in Mediterranean countries, where women remain 
underrepresented among employees, their increasing educational attainments remain obscured. 
At the same time, the situation when women obtain education and do not work is certainly the 
worst outcome, resulting in the major waste of human capital
29
.  
The realities moreover are such that women generally tend to perform less qualified and 
less paid jobs (Bettio and Verashchagina, 2009). This is partly explained by pre-market choices 
of specialization which guides them to traditionally female dominated sectors (ibidem). 
However, horizontal segregation does not always cause overeducation. An example of school 
teaching (largely performed by women) represents the case when there is practically no 
mismatch, due to formalized recruitment procedures. A completely different situation is when 
women try to enter the traditionally male dominated occupations. They often do not manage to 
compete due to higher family burden and thus hold positions which do not correspond to the 
level of education obtained (on par or even higher than men's). Thus there are two actions to be 
supported. One is to encourage atypical choices of professions by women. Another is to 
eliminate the obstacles they meet further entering the labour market. Given the ever increasing 
input from female labour, this may result in reducing educational mismatch. 
 
 
Concluding remarks and policy implications 
This paper deals with the effects of demand and supply factors on educational 
qualifications mismatch in Europe.  
We estimated country-specific ordered probit models (separately for men and women, and 
taking into account the issue of sample selection) in order to assess the effects of demand and 
supply factors on the probability of being under-/properly or overeducated in ten European 
countries representing different patterns of labour market regulation, degrees of technological 
intensity and the incidence of educational mismatch.  
The empirical findings are supportive to the hypothesis that the adoption of new 
technologies produces a relative demand shift which favours highly educated workers and 
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 One cannot even identify these cases by looking at employed only, like in case of Table 2. 
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reduces overeducation. What counts nevertheless is the level of technological development that 
has been achieved and the pace of it. The demand side factors appear to function better in 
technologically advanced countries, whereas supply side factors are more efficient in balancing 
the educational mismatch in countries with lower technological development. In this respect, we 
also want to highlight that EPL does not appear to hinder the technological change. 
Our results show that the joint effect of demand factors does not exceed the joint effect of 
supply factors. Moreover, demand factors are often more effective in pushing up labour force 
participation rather than reducing overeducation, whereas supply factors play important role for 
both increasing participation and reducing overeducation.  
Overall, policy initiatives targeted at reducing educational mismatch are expected to be 
more effective when dealing with the supply side effects and need to take into account country 
specificities as well as to identify the target groups, e.g. men/women, younger/older workers.  
At the same time, demand factors should not be neglected, especially during the times of 
the crisis in Europe. The revealed potential of increasing the efficiency of R&D sector as the 
mean to counter educational mismatch is particularly important. More generally, enhancing the 
technological level is expected to improve job-education matches. 
Other policy implications that emerge from our study include the improvement of school-
to-work transition (the German system can be an example to follow), by also promoting a better 
use of temporary contracts. In particular, temporary contract should imply for young workers 
giving up some job-security in exchange for a better match. At the limit, they should be used as a 
‘stepping stone’ to higher quality jobs. 
Our results also show that increasing investments into cultural infrastructure, in order to 
incentivize participation into LLL, would improve educational match throughout Europe. 
Providing guidance in the choice of field of study, especially for women, has a potential to 
reduce educational mismatch. Reconciliation policies are also expected to produce positive 
effects by augmenting aspirations about future job possibilities and, eventually, making women 
more competitive in the labour markets. 
The positive examples here identified, in particular Finland for Scandinavian countries and 
Germany for Western European countries, are characterizes by the capacity to create a self-
sustaining mechanism of human capital production and utilization. These countries also adhere 
to a flexicurity model able to effectively include the groups of vulnerable workers, in particular 
women and youth. All this results in the lower incidence of overeducation. 
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A. Appendix of Tables 
 
 
Table A.1. Technology, aggregate human capital, employment protection and the incidence 
of overeducation, by country 
Country Pat R&D Temp EPL LMP_GDP LLL 
HC 
(% of 5&6 
ISCED) 
% of 
overeducated 
AT 47.74 2.05 7.2 2.2 1.8 12.9 18 8.91 
BE 64.28 1.5 8.5 2.5 3.5 9.5 29 21.49 
CZ 1.455 2.19 8.5 1.9 0.5 6.3 12 16.57 
DK 82.97 1.63 9.5 1.8 4.3 26.5 31.9 10.51 
FI 231.12 1.46 17.9 2.1 2.9 23.5 33.2 12.39 
FR 68.38 1.56 13.4 2.9 2.7 7.9 23.9 16.57 
DE 95.98 1.88 12.2 2.5 3.4 7.4 24 14.41 
EL 3.532 0.76 11.3 2.9 0.6 1.8 18.5 23.04 
ES 7.374 1.19 31.8 3.1 2.1 5.1 25.2 23.56 
HU 6.327 1.52 7.6 1.7 0.7 4.6 15.4 22.44 
IE 33.69 1.46 4.6 1.3 1.6 7.2 26.7 26.47 
IT 19.3 1.5 9.5 2.4 1.3 6.8 10.7 19.95 
NL 142.75 1.63 14.4 2.3 3.5 17.3 27.5 12.69 
PL 0.588 1.07 18.9 2.1 1.3 5.5 14.1 18.32 
PT 1.288 1.65 20.6 3.5 1.8 4.8 11 15.26 
SK 1.554 0.91 4.7 2 0.5 4.6 11.8 20.7 
SE 113.63 2.39 15.6 2.6 2.4 35.8 27.2 7.61 
UK 55.6 1.64 5.7 1.1 0.6 35.5 28.3 19.52 
 Sourc: Eurostat online database (for Pat, R&D, Temp, LMP_GDP and LLL), OECD indicators (for EPL) and EU-
LFS 2003. 
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Table A.2. Variables definition 
 
Variable name Definition 
Dependent variable  
Educational mismatch =1 if the person is undereducated, i.e. the number of years of education obtained are 
lower than the mode within occupation, at 2-digit ISCO; 
=2 if the person is properly matched, i.e. years of education are equal to the mode; 
=3 if the person is overeducated, i.e. years of education are higher than the mode.  
Work =1 if the person is working, 0 otherwise (unemployed or inactive). 
Demand factors*, by regions (at NUTS 2 level) 
Patent application High-tech patent applications to the EPO, per mln. labour force. 
Youth unemployment rate Youth unemployment rate. 
Gross fixed capital formation Gross fixed capital formation, in mln. Euro per population aged 15+. 
ISCO123 Share of ISCO 1, 2 and 3 occupations among the employed population (%). 
Expenditure per worker  Expenditure per worker in R&D sector , in percentage of GDP. 
Supply factors 
Age (Age2) Age(Age squared). 
Married =1 if the person is married, 0 otherwise. 
Small firm =1 if the person is working for a small firm, less than 50 employees, 0 otherwise. 
Part-time worker =1 if the person is working part-time, 0 otherwise. 
Temporary contract =1 if the person is on temporary contract, 0 otherwise. 
Sector of employment:  
Agr_hunt_forestry_fish, 
Constr, Trade, Hot&Rest, 
Transp_communic, Finance, 
Business, Publ_Admin, 
Educ, Health, Services.  
Dummies for: 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing; Construction; Trade; Hotels and 
Restaurants, Transport and Communications, Finance, Business, Public 
administration, Education, Health, Services. 
Mover =1 if the person works in a different region from where s/he lives, 0 otherwise. 
Index LLL Index with values ranging from 0 to 4. The maximum corresponds to a situation 
when the person participates in all of the following activities:  
- self studying by making use of printed materials (books, magazines); 
- computer-based learning/training; internet based education; 
- studying by making use of educational broadcasting or off-line computer 
based; 
- visiting libraries, learning centers and the like. 
0, if the person participates in none of the above activities. 
High/Medium/Low level of 
education 
=1 if the education level corresponds to ISCED 5 and 6 – tertiary and above/ upper 
secondary/ lower secondary. 
Field of education:  
general programs, education, 
humanities, social, science, 
engineering, agriculture, 
health, services 
Dummies for the field of highest level of education successfully completed. The 
baseline is general programs/services, depending on the coding of variables (for 
details see Table A2 with descriptive statistics). 
Instrumental variable 
Live_alone =1 if the person lives alone, 0 otherwise. 
Young_children =1 presence of children under 5 years. 
Note: * In order to account for the lagged effect of the demand factors, whenever possible, they have been defined 
as an average values between the years 2000-2003 (see Eurostat online database, section Science, Technology and 
Innovation http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/science_technology_innovation/data/database ]. 
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Table A.3. Descriptive statistics 
Variable  ITALY GREECE PORTUGAL SPAIN FRANCE 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Educational mismatch 1.97 (0.68) 1.86 (0.70) 2.05 (0.70) 1.89 (0.63) 1.20 (0.57) 1.96 (0.58) 1.90 (0.74) 1.96 (0.72) 1.66 (0.69) 1.76 (0.73) 
*Patents application  0.18 (0.15) 0.17 (0.14) 0.04 (0.02) 0.04 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.06 (0.04) 0.06 (0.04) 0.61 (0.59) 0.61 (0.58) 
*Youth unemployment rate  27.29 (18.49) 27.47 (18.47) 27.07 (4.53) 27.02 (4.52) 14.36 (3.97) 14.4 (3.94) 22.87 (4.62) 22.92 (4.62) 18.57 (3.58) 18.58 (3.58) 
*Expenditure per worker in R&D sector   1.48 (0.13) 1.48 (0.13)  0.83 (0.24) 0.83 (0.24) 1.70 (1.02) 1.70 (1.01) 1.16 (0.14) 1.16 (0.14) 1.49 (0.21) 1.49 (0.21) 
*Gross fixed capital formation  5.60 (1.52) 5.58 (1.50) 4.44 (0.96) 4.44 (0.95) 3.93 (1.14) 3.91 (1.12) 5.75 (1.06) 5.74 (1.06) 6.11 (2.00) 6.07 (1.97) 
*ISCO123 among employed 32.89 (2.68) 32.89 (2.67) 29.38 (5.13) 29.5 (5.11) 22.35 (6.02) 22.39 (6.06) 30.74 (2.90) 30.70 (2.89) 39.06 (7.20) 39.01 (7.10) 
Age 44.07 (11.22) 44.21 (11.27)  44.19 (11.34) 44.53 (11.20) 44.3 (11.23) 44.96 (11.14) 43.22 (11.18) 43.62 (11.11) 44.0 (10.81) 43.98 (10.80) 
Married 0.28  0.20 0.26  0.14  0.20  0.13  0.29  0.20  0.29  0.24  
Small firm 0.39  0.26 0.38 0.27 0.28  0.22 0.26  0.19 0.23  0.24 
Part-time worker 0.02  0.08 0.01  0.03 0.03  0.10  0.02 0.08 0.04  0.19 
Temporary contract 0.03  0.04 0.04  0.04 0.09  0.09  0.15 0.12 0.05  0.06  
Mover 0.02  0.01 0.002  0.001  0.03 0.01 0.02  0.01 0.06  0.03  
Index LLL 1.07  0.96 0.30   0.23  0.83  0.79  0.29  0.28 0.15  0.13  
High level of education 0.10  0.11 0.18  0.16 0.07 0.11  0.24  0.24  0.22  0.24  
Medium level of education 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.34  0.10  0.10 0.17 0.16  0.44  0.38  
Low level of education 0.54  0.55 0.46  0.49 0.83  0.79 0.59 0.60  0.34  0.38  
General programs 0.0  0.0 0.23  0.26 0.85  0.80 0.11 0.10  0.00  0.001  
Education 0.01  0.08 0.01  0.03 0.01 0.04  0.02  0.05  0.01 0.02  
Humanities 0.04  0.07 0.02  0.04  0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03  0.04  0.08  
Social sciences 0.12 0.16 0.06  0.07  0.04 0.05  0.25 0.12  0.12  0.29  
Science 0.04  0.04 0.03 0.02  0.03  0.02 0.02 0.02  0.05  0.04  
Engineering 0.13  0.02 0.13 0.02 0.03  0.01 0.12  0.04  0.32  0.05  
Agriculture 0.01  0.01 0.01  0.01  0.01 0.01 0.01  0.01  0.04  0.01  
Health 0.02  0.02 0.02 0.04  0.01  0.02 0.02  0.06  0.03  0.09  
Services 0.04  0.02 0.04  0.02 0.01 0.01  0.01  0.02 0.02  0.04 
Work 0.76  0.46 0.82 0.49  0.82  0.64 0.80 0.48 0.77  0.63  
Live_alone 0.08 0.07 - - - - 0.04  0.04  0.14  0.12  
Young_children - - 0.11 0.11  0.14  0.14 - - - - 
Nobs 52052 54341 18759 19704 11512 12456 45969 47411 84515 90730 
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Table A.3 continued 
Variable  GERMANY CZECH REPUBLIC HUNGARY FINLAND UNITED KINGDOM 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Educational mismatch 1.97 (0.59) 1.90 (0.57) 2.0 (0.59) 1.87 (0.60) 2.04 (0.66) 1.95 (0.67) 1.71 (0.64) 1.77 (0.69) 1.79 (0.74) 1.77 (0.77) 
*Patents application  0.97 (0.65) 0.96 (0.64) 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.05 (0.05) 0.05 (0.05) 2.25 (0.86) 2.25 (0.87) 0.47(0.37) 0.47 (0.37) 
*Youth unemployment rate  10.94 (4.03) 10.95 (4.04) 18.20 (7.02) 18.27 (7.07) 13.80 (3.71) 13.86 (3.69) 21.9 (4.07) 21.9 (4.1) 12.31 (2.63) 12.27 (2.61) 
*Expenditure per worker in R&D sector   1.92 (0.26) 1.92 (0.25) 2.37 (0.91) 2.37 (0.92) 1.40 (0.27) 1.41 (0.27)  1.44 (0.16) 1.43 (0.16) 1.41 (0.57) 1.40 (0.57) 
*Gross fixed capital formation  5.82 (1.33) 5.79 (1.31) 2.44 (0.9) 2.42 (0.87) 1.71 (0.40) 1.70 (0.40) 6.17 (0.99) 6.18 (0.99) 5.82 (1.72) 5.80 (1.71) 
*ISCO123 among employed 41.92 (3.31) 41.89 (3.28) 35.42 (6.11) 35.25 (5.93) 28.76 (5.05 28.69 (4.99) 40.5 (4.6) 40.60 (4.63) 37.44 (9.81) 37.26 (9.84) 
Age 44.51 (11.03) 44.77 (11.07) 44.1 (11.4) 44.66 (11) 43.68 (11.22) 44.67 (11.36) 44.6 (10.9) 44.95 (10.72) 44.20 (10.89) 43.86 (10.94) 
Married 0.27  0.17  0.19  0.09  0.22  0.11 0.31  0.23  0.24 0.19  
Small firm 0.21  0.24  0.23  0.24 0.23  0.20  0.27  0.29  0.19  0.19  
Part-time worker 0.04  0.27  0.01  0.05  0.02  0.03  0.04  0.10  0.05  0.30  
Temporary contract 0.04  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.04  0.03  0.05  0.10  0.03  0.04  
Mover 0.62  0.50  0.04  0.02  0.04  0.02  0.16  0.13 0.07  0.03  
Index LLL 0.97  0.86  na na 0.11  0.11  1.11   1.28  na na 
High level of education 0.27  0.19  0.12  0.10  0.11  0.13  0.29  0.37  0.28   0.25  
Medium level of education 0.57  0.58  0.80  0.73  0.63  0.51 0.45  0.41  0.38  0.26  
Low level of education 0.11  0.19  0.08  0.17 0.26  0.36  0.26  0.23  0.25  0.34  
General programs 0.03  0.02  0.02  0.05  0.04 0.11  0.06  0.05  0.01  0.01 
Education 0.03  0.06  0.01  0.06  0.02 0.06  0.01  0.04  0.01  0.03  
Humanities 0.03  0.03  0.01  0.02 0.01 0.01  0.02  0.05  0.04  0.06  
Social sciences 0.14  0.31  0.05  0.26  0.04 0.19  0.09  0.20  0.09  0.11  
Science 0.03  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01 0.01  0.02  0.02  0.06  0.03  
Engineering 0.46  0.08  0.69  0.22  0.54 0.13  0.41  0.08  0.19  0.01  
Agriculture 0.03  0.02  0.07  0.05  0.05 0.02  0.05  0.02 0.01  0.003  
Health 0.03  0.11  0.01  0.08  0.01 0.06  0.03  0.18  0.02  0.08  
Services 0.05  0.08  0.05  0.08  0.04 0.05  0.05  0.14  0.02  0.03  
Work 0.76  0.62  0.82  0.63  0.68 0.53 0.78  0.73  0.83  0.68  
Live_alone 0.18  0.14  0.08  0.07  0.06 0.08  na na 0.15  0.12  
Nobs 91010 91363 16339 17490 22955 24671 12913 13170 32523 35656 
Note: Means of variables (standard deviations are in parenthesis, except for dummies); * variables defined at regional level. 
 31 
Table A.4. Ordered probit estimates, correcting for sample selection bias  
 
A.4.1. ITALY  
Variables 
Men Women 
Coefficients Marginal effects Coefficients Marginal effects 
Selection 
equation 
Educat. 
mismatch 
  Under-      Properly       Over- 
educated 
Selection 
equation 
Educat. 
mismatch 
  Under-      Properly      Over- 
educated 
Demand factors           
Patents application -0.083 -0.010 0.003 -0.0003 -0.002 0.028 -0.111 0.039 -0.013 -0.025 
 0.062 0.065 0.018 0.002 0.016 0.210 0.128 0.044 0.015 0.029 
Youth_UR -0.009*** 0.002 -0.001 0.0001 0.0005 -0.017*** 0.006** -0.002** 0.001** 0.001** 
 0.001 0.001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Gross fixed capital 0.011 -0.016 0.004 -0.0005 -0.004 0.020 -0.033 0.012 -0.004 -0.008 
formation ǂ 0.015 0.013 0.004 0.0004 0.003 0.025 0.018 0.006 0.002 0.004 
Expenditure/worker -0.065 0.120 -0.033 0.004 0.029 0.040 0.224 -0.078 0.027 0.051 
in R&D sector ǂ 0.113 0.100 0.026 0.003 0.023 0.210 0.140 0.048 0.016 0.031 
ISCO123 among 0.013* -0.007 0.002 -0.0002 -0.002 0.010 -0.003 0.001 -0.0003 -0.0006 
employed 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.0002 0.001 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.0008 0.001 
Supply factors           
Age -0.055*** -0.015*** 0.004*** 0.0005*** -0.004*** -0.025*** -0.017*** 0.006*** -0.002*** -0.004*** 
 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.0001 0.0005 -0.01 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Married -1.036*** 0.138*** -0.037*** 0.002*** 0.034*** -0.022 -0.050** 0.017** -0.006** -0.011** 
 0.032 0.039 0.010 0.001 0.010 -0.04 0.017 0.006 0.002 0.004 
Index LLL 0.018* -0.154*** 0.042*** -0.005*** -0.037*** 0.089*** -0.197*** 0.068*** -0.024*** -0.045*** 
 0.007 0.009 0.003 0.001 0.002 -0.01 0.013 0.005 0.002 0.003 
High level of  0.691*** 1.730*** -0.246*** -0.338*** 0.584*** 0.949*** 1.085*** -0.290*** -0.039** 0.329*** 
education 0.03 0.064 0.007 0.017 0.021 -0.09 0.080 0.017 0.013 0.028 
Medium level of  0.353*** 1.384*** -0.329*** -0.044*** 0.372*** 0.499*** 0.609*** -0.206*** 0.065*** 0.142*** 
education 0.026 0.049 0.009 0.007 0.012 -0.04 0.051 0.017 0.006 0.012 
Education -0.024 -0.300*** 0.091** -0.030 -0.062*** 0.269*** -0.737*** 0.279*** -0.158*** -0.121*** 
 0.063 0.09 0.031 0.015 0.016 -0.04 0.055 0.022 0.016 0.006 
Humanities -0.268*** -0.132** 0.038* -0.008 -0.030** -0.148** 0.007 -0.002 0.001 0.001 
 0.038 0.051 0.015 0.005 0.011 -0.05 0.031 0.011 0.004 0.007 
Social -0.065* -0.132** 0.037** -0.007 -0.030** 0.079* 0.004 -0.001 0.000 0.001 
 0.031 0.046 0.014 0.004 0.010 -0.04 0.041 0.014 0.005 0.009 
Science -0.492*** -0.301*** 0.091*** -0.029** -0.063*** -0.181*** -0.157*** 0.056*** -0.023*** -0.033*** 
 0.05 0.058 0.020 0.009 0.010 -0.05 0.027 0.010 0.005 0.005 
Engineering 0.01 -0.096** 0.027** -0.005* -0.022** 0.078 0.029 -0.010 0.003 0.007 
 0.034 0.036 0.010 0.002 0.008 -0.05 0.044 0.015 0.005 0.010 
Agriculture 0.012 0.089 -0.023 0.001 0.022 -0.152 0.231 -0.075 0.016*** 0.059 
 0.084 0.083 0.021 0.001 0.022 -0.11 0.153 0.046 0.003 0.043 
Health 0.212** -0.474*** 0.152*** -0.063*** -0.089*** 0.254*** -0.356*** 0.132*** -0.065*** -0.067*** 
 0.066 0.081 0.030 0.019 0.012 -0.06 0.060 0.024 0.015 0.009 
Live_alone 0.446*** - - - - 0.278*** - - - - 
 0.035 - - - - -0.02 - - - - 
Invmills - -0.490*** 0.133*** -0.015*** -0.118*** - -0.759*** 0.263*** -0.091*** -0.172*** 
 - 0.09 0.024 0.003 0.022 - -0.15 0.051 0.017 0.034 
Const 3.060*** - - - - 0.592 - - - - 
 0.387 - - - - -0.47 - - - - 
cut1  Const - -1.382*** - - - - -1.843*** - - - 
 - 0.204 - - - - 0.275 - - - 
cut2  Const - 0.498* - - - - -0.252 - - - 
 - 0.206 - - - - 0.280 - - - 
Pseudo R2 0.16 0.17 - - - 0.16 0.12 - - - 
Nobs 47907 35312 - - - 53846 24534 - - - 
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A.4.2. GREECE   
Variables 
Men Women 
Coefficients Marginal effects Coefficients Marginal effects 
Selection 
equation 
Educat. 
mismatch 
  Under-      Properly       Over- 
educated 
Selection 
equation 
Educat. 
mismatch 
  Under-      Properly       Over- 
educated 
Demand  factors           
Patents application ǂ 3.675*** -0.425 0.119 0.017 -0.136 3.150** -3.964 1.225 -0.398 -0.827 
 0.856 1.242 0.349 0.049 0.397 1.182 2.692 0.833 0.256 0.581 
Youth_UR 0.003 0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.003 -0.007 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.001 
Gross fixed capital -0.043*** 0.022 -0.006 -0.001 0.007 -0.052*** 0.037 -0.011 0.004 0.008 
formation 0.012 0.026 0.007 0.001 0.008 0.016 0.042 0.013 0.004 0.009 
Expenditure/worker -0.003 0.115 -0.032 -0.005 0.037 0.073 0.451* -0.140* 0.045* 0.094* 
in R&D sector ǂ 0.090 0.090 0.025 0.004 0.028 0.130 0.200 0.061 0.020 0.042 
ISCO123 among  -0.018*** -0.01 0.003 0.000 -0.003 -0.029*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
employed 0.003 0.006 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.012 0.004 0.001 0.002 
Supply factors           
Age -0.053*** -0.025*** 0.007*** 0.001***  -0.008*** -0.024*** -0.003 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Married -0.935*** -0.256*   0.076* 0.003  -0.079* 0.048 -0.221*** 0.072***  -0.029***  -0.043*** 
 0.049 0.109 0.035 0.002 0.033 0.070 0.048 0.017 0.007 0.010 
Index LLL 0.048** -0.156*** 0.044*** 0.006***  -0.050*** 0.086** -0.183*** 0.057***  -0.018***  -0.038*** 
 0.017 0.016 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.026 0.023 0.007 0.003 0.005 
High level of  0.011 1.187***  -0.235***  -0.195*** 0.430*** 0.575*** 2.026***  -0.407*** -0.190*** 0.597*** 
education 0.063 0.052 0.011 0.012 0.020 0.059 0.110 0.021 0.022 0.031 
Medium level of -0.106** 0.574***  -0.150***  -0.041*** 0.191*** 0.07 0.583***  -0.168*** 0.034*** 0.134*** 
education 0.035 0.040 0.007 0.005 0.011 0.068 0.053 0.012 0.008 0.013 
Education -0.165** -0.805*** 0.285***  -0.100***  -0.185*** 0.298*** -1.355*** 0.500***  -0.367***  -0.133*** 
 0.054 0.087 0.035 0.022 0.015 0.074 0.083 0.028 0.031 0.007 
Humanities 0.137** -0.718***  0.250***  -0.078***  -0.172*** 0.260*** -1.344*** 0.495***  -0.357***  -0.138*** 
 0.047 0.040 0.015 0.009 0.008 0.045 0.083 0.030 0.029 0.009 
Social 0.123* -0.630*** 0.212***  -0.051***  -0.161*** 0.179*** -1.159*** 0.426***  -0.288***  -0.138*** 
 0.059 0.090 0.037 0.017 0.021 0.034 0.106 0.041 0.036 0.011 
Science 0.115* -0.648*** 0.221***  -0.060***  -0.162*** 0.324* -1.207*** 0.450***  -0.326***  -0.123*** 
 0.050 0.055 0.022 0.011 0.012 0.142 0.063 0.023 0.024 0.007 
Engineering 0.115** -0.078 0.022 0.002* -0.024 0.243*** -0.727*** 0.266***  -0.167***  -0.099*** 
 0.035 0.052 0.016 0.001 0.016 0.067 0.133 0.055 0.044 0.013 
Agriculture 0.031 -0.008 0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.176 -0.646**  0.235**  -0.144*  -0.091*** 
 0.195 0.122 0.035 0.004 0.039 0.140 0.205 0.083 0.068 0.016 
Health 0.159 -0.809*** 0.285***  -0.098***  -0.187*** 0.332*** -1.389*** 0.510***  -0.371***  -0.139*** 
 0.103 0.091 0.038 0.021 0.017 0.040 0.045 0.016 0.017 0.009 
Young_children 0.114* - - - - -0.372*** - - - - 
 0.049 - - - - 0.025 - - - - 
Invmills - 0.610***  -0.171***  -0.024**  0.195*** - 0.067 -0.021 0.007 0.014 
 - 0.174 0.051 0.008 0.059 - 0.225 0.069 0.023 0.047 
Const 4.140*** - - - - 1.929*** - - - - 
 0.189 - - - - 0.219 - - - - 
cut1  Const - -1.675*** - - - - -0.746 - - - 
 - 0.317 - - - - 0.403 - - - 
cut2  Const - -0.174 - - - - 1.106**  - - - 
 - 0.329 - - - - 0.392 - - - 
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.055 - - - 0.09 0.08 - - - 
Nobs 18759 15416 - - - 19704 9653 - - - 
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A.4.3. PORTUGAL 
Variables 
Men Women 
Coefficients Marginal effects Coefficients Marginal effects 
Selection 
equation 
Educat. 
mismatch 
  Under-      Properly       Over- 
educated 
Selection 
equation 
Educat. 
mismatch 
 Under-       Properly       Over- 
educated 
Demand factors           
Patents application ǂ -4.671* -1.591**  0.295** 0.090**  -0.385** -7.303 -3.829*** 0.719*** 0.153***  -0.872*** 
 1.960 0.570 0.094 0.034 0.128 -4.350 -0.830 0.195 0.026 0.220 
Youth_UR -0.016* 0.007**   -0.001** -0.0004*** 0.002** -0.016 -0.005*   0.001* 0.0002*  -0.001* 
 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Gross fixed capital 0.147*** 0.065***  -0.012***  -0.004*** 0.016*** 0.087 0.064***  -0.012***  -0.003*** 0.015*** 
formation 0.040 0.020 0.003 0.001 0.004 -0.090 -0.010 0.002 0.000 0.003 
Expenditure/worker 0.066 0.007 -0.001 -0.0004 0.002 0.094 -0.108* 0.020* 0.004* -0.025* 
in R&D sector ǂ 0.080 0.030 0.005 0.002 0.007 0.120 0.050 0.009 0.002 0.011 
ISCO123 among  -0.010*** -0.005*** 0.001*** 0.0003***  -0.001*** -0.004 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
employed 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Supply factors           
Age -0.049*** -0.013*   0.002* 0.001*  -0.003* -0.030*** -0.013**  0.002* 0.001***  -0.003** 
 0.000 0.010 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Married -0.944*** -0.080 0.015 0.004 -0.019 -0.120 -0.136*** 0.027*** 0.002***  -0.030*** 
 0.050 0.110 0.022 0.004 0.026 -0.080 -0.040 0.007 0.000 0.007 
Index LLL 0.043*** -0.091*** 0.017*** 0.005***  -0.022*** 0.071*** -0.172*** 0.032*** 0.007***  -0.039*** 
 0.010 0.010 0.003 0.001 0.003 -0.020 -0.020 0.004 0.001 0.005 
High level of  0.191 0.672***  -0.086***  -0.119*** 0.206*** 0.621*** 1.144***  -0.132***  -0.225***  0.356*** 
education 0.110 -0.100 0.014 0.029 0.041 -0.180 -0.160 0.018 0.047 0.062 
Medium level of -0.179* 0.787***  -0.099***  -0.145*** 0.244*** 0.284* 0.910***  -0.113***  -0.162*** 0.274*** 
education 0.070 0.150 0.017 0.042 0.058 -0.130 -0.150 0.012 0.042 0.049 
Education 0.467* -0.426 0.100 -0.018 -0.082 -0.160 -0.895***  0.252***  -0.126**  -0.126*** 
 0.220 0.240 0.073 0.034 0.039 -0.150 -0.170 0.060 0.050 0.013 
Humanities 0.067 -0.187 0.039 0.003 -0.041 -0.045 -0.207 0.043 -0.001 -0.042 
 0.130 0.110 0.024 0.003 0.021 -0.100 -0.180 0.041 0.008 0.032 
Social -0.037 0.159 -0.027 -0.014 0.041 -0.097 -0.300**   0.066* -0.006  -0.059** 
 0.110 0.150 0.021 0.018 0.039 -0.130 -0.110 0.028 0.009 0.020 
Science -0.211 -0.208 0.043 0.002 -0.046 -0.094 -0.384**  0.089* -0.017  -0.071*** 
 0.110 0.160 0.040 0.006 0.033 -0.140 -0.150 0.037 0.018 0.019 
Engineering 0.025 0.220**   -0.036*** -0.023 0.059** -0.377 -0.363 0.084 -0.016  -0.068* 
 0.190 0.080 0.010 0.013 0.023 -0.230 -0.220 0.057 0.028 0.030 
Agriculture -0.011 0.314 -0.048 -0.040 0.088 -0.268 -0.131 0.027 0.001 -0.028 
 0.470 0.390 0.045 0.076 0.121 -0.360 -0.390 0.085 0.008 0.077 
Health 0.670 -0.303 0.067 -0.004 -0.063 0.256 -0.690*** 0.183***  -0.075*  -0.107*** 
 0.370 0.280 0.074 0.024 0.050 -0.160 -0.140 0.047 0.035 0.014 
Young_children -0.011 - - - - -0.232*** - - - - 
 0.070 - - - - -0.060 - - - - 
Invmills - 0.071 -0.013 -0.004 0.017 - 0.009 -0.002 0.000 0.002 
  - 0.360 0.067 0.021 0.087 - -0.230 0.044 0.009 0.053 
Const 3.390*** - - - - 1.830*** - - - - 
 0.180 - - - - -0.200 - - - - 
cut1  Const - -1.531*** - - - - -1.667*** - - - 
 - 0.200 - - - - -0.070 - - - 
cut2  Const - 0.707*** - - - - 0.619*** - - - 
 - 0.17 - - - - -0.17 - - - 
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.04 - - - 0.08 0.05 - - - 
Nobs 10176 8507 - - - 10587 7110 - - - 
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A.4.4. SPAIN 
Variables 
Men Women 
Coefficients Marginal effects Coefficients Marginal effects 
Selection 
equation 
Educat. 
mismatch 
  Under-      Properly       Over- 
educated 
Selection 
equation 
Educat. 
mismatch 
 Under-       Properly       Over- 
educated 
Demand factors           
Patents application  0.794 0.001 -0.044 0.009 0.035 1.088 -1.777*** 0.585***  -0.047**  -0.538*** 
 0.851 0.010 0.205 0.043 0.162 0.923 0.509 0.164 0.017 0.157 
Youth_UR -0.024*** -0.025**  0.009**  -0.002**  -0.007** -0.005 0.004 -0.001 0.0001 0.001 
 0.005 0.009 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.010 0.010 0.003 0.0002 0.003 
Gross fixed capital 0.048 -0.087*   0.030*  -0.006*  -0.024* 0.102* -0.085*   0.028**  -0.002*  -0.026* 
formation ǂ 0.035 0.041 0.014 0.003 0.011 0.040 0.034 0.011 0.001 0.010 
Expenditure/worker 0.012 0.064 -0.022 0.005 0.018 -0.144 -0.146 0.048 -0.004 -0.044 
in R&D sector ǂ 0.150 0.260 0.090 0.018 0.071 0.210 0.180 0.060 0.005 0.055 
ISCO123 among  -0.003 -0.011 0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.017 0.016 -0.005 0.0004 0.005 
employed 0.008 0.009 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.010 0.008 0.003 0.0003 0.002 
Supply factors           
Age -0.041*** -0.032*** 0.011***  -0.002***  -0.009*** -0.020*** -0.005*   0.002* -0.0001  -0.001* 
 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.0001 0.001 
Married -0.907*** -0.237*** 0.084***  -0.023***  -0.062*** 0.143*** -0.254*** 0.086***  -0.013***  -0.074*** 
 0.030 0.060 0.023 0.007 0.016 0.030 0.020 0.007 0.002 0.006 
Index LLL -0.011 -0.204*** 0.071***  -0.015***  -0.056*** 0.032*** -0.212*** 0.070***  -0.006**  -0.064*** 
 0.010 0.010 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.010 0.010 0.004 0.002 0.005 
High level of  0.113** 0.855***  -0.255*** -0.015 0.270*** 0.804*** -0.211 0.070 -0.008 -0.062 
education 0.040 0.080 0.023 0.009 0.025 0.040 0.120 0.040 0.006 0.034 
Medium level of 0.124*** 0.910***  -0.256***  -0.044*** 0.300*** 0.397*** 0.015 -0.005 0.000 0.005 
education 0.030 0.050 0.014 0.011 0.019 0.030 0.060 0.020 0.001 0.018 
Education 0.191*** 0.091 -0.031 0.005** 0.026 0.173*** -0.014 0.005 0.000 -0.004 
 0.040 0.060 0.019 0.002 0.018 0.050 0.060 0.021 0.002 0.019 
Humanities 0.229*** 0.155**   -0.052** 0.006*** 0.045** -0.106* 0.125 -0.040 0.000 0.040 
 0.060 0.050 0.016 0.002 0.017 0.050 0.070 0.021 0.002 0.023 
Social 0.127** 0.048 -0.017 0.003 0.013 -0.093** 0.086 -0.028 0.001 0.026 
 0.040 0.060 0.020 0.003 0.017 0.030 0.060 0.019 0.001 0.019 
Science -0.032 0.046 -0.016 0.003 0.013 -0.011 0.060 -0.019 0.001 0.019 
 0.050 0.040 0.013 0.002 0.011 0.070 0.080 0.025 0.001 0.025 
Engineering 0.199*** 0.699***  -0.202*** -0.027 0.229*** -0.166* 0.256***  -0.077*** -0.007  0.084*** 
 0.040 0.050 0.010 0.014 0.022 0.070 0.070 0.021 0.006 0.027 
Agriculture 0.281** 0.464***  -0.138*** -0.011 0.149*** -0.245 0.128 -0.040 0.000 0.041 
 0.090 0.090 0.021 0.015 0.035 0.140 0.070 0.022 0.002 0.024 
Health 0.443*** 0.168**   -0.056** 0.006*** 0.049** 0.361*** 0.140*    -0.044* 0.000 0.044* 
 0.060 0.060 0.019 0.002 0.020 0.040 0.060 0.019 0.002 0.020 
Live_alone 0.240*** - - - - 0.344*** - - - - 
 0.030 - - - - 0.050 - - - - 
Invmills - 0.706***  -0.245*** 0.051*** 0.193** - -1.132*** 0.372*** -0.030*** -0.343*** 
 - 0.210 0.072 0.013 0.061 - 0.180 0.058 0.011 0.055 
Const 3.145*** - - - - 0.481 - - - - 
 0.360 - - - - 0.410 - - - - 
cut1  Const - -2.685*** - - - - -1.867*** - - - 
 - 0.480 - - - - 0.540 - - - 
cut2  Const - -1.285**  - - - - -0.505 - - - 
 - 0.470 - - - - 0.540 - - - 
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.12 - - - 0.12 0.04 - - - 
Nobs 43468 34666 - - - 44949 21546 - - - 
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A.4.5. CZECH REPUBLIC 
Variables 
Men Women 
Coefficients Marginal effects Coefficients Marginal effects 
Selection 
equation 
Educat. 
mismatch 
  Under-      Properly       Over- 
educated 
Selection 
equation 
Educat. 
mismatch 
 Under-       Properly       Over- 
educated 
Demand factors           
Patents application ǂ -5.741 6.22 -1.529 0.125 1.404 -11.092*** 8.095 -2.642 1.532 1.110 
 3.423 3.306 0.819 0.076 0.750 2.887 5.068 1.660 0.959 0.703 
Youth_UR -0.023*** -0.003 0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0008 -0.009*** -0.003 0.001 -0.0005 -0.0004 
 0.002 0.002 0.0005 0.0001 0.0005 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.0005 0.0004 
Gross fixed capital 0.092* -0.150*** 0.037***  -0.003***  -0.034*** 0.126*** -0.212*** 0.069***  -0.041***  -0.029*** 
formation 0.044 0.039 0.010 0.001 0.009 0.030 0.061 0.020 0.012 0.008 
Expenditure/worker 0.020 -0.010 0.002 -0.0002 -0.002 0.004 -0.016 0.005 -0.003 -0.002 
in R&D sector ǂ 0.050 0.010 0.002 0.0002 0.003 0.050 0.010 0.004 0.003 0.002 
ISCO123 among  0.009* 0.0007 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.014*** 0.000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
employed 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.0001 0.0007 0.004 0.004 0.0012 0.0007 0.0005 
Supply factors           
Age -0.059*** 0.011**   -0.003** 0.0002*** 0.002** -0.021*** 0.010 -0.003 0.002 0.001 
 0.002 0.003 0.0009 0.0001 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.001 
Married -0.802*** 0.167**   -0.034** -0.001 0.040** -0.073* 0.038 -0.012 0.007 0.005 
 0.031 0.060 0.013 0.002 0.016 0.037 0.088 0.028 0.016 0.013 
Index LLL na na - - - na na - - - 
 - - - - - - - - - - 
High level of  1.021*** 3.215***  -0.296***  -0.594*** 0.891*** 0.792*** 3.338***  -0.408***  -0.490*** 0.899*** 
education 0.110 0.080 0.009 0.011 0.008 0.080 0.240 0.017 0.021 0.031 
Medium level of 0.626*** 2.451***  -0.769*** 0.497*** 0.271*** 0.499*** 2.930***  -0.852*** 0.637*** 0.215*** 
education 0.080 0.040 0.008 0.012 0.008 0.030 0.200 0.024 0.016 0.016 
Education 0.406* -0.604*** 0.188***  -0.091*  -0.097*** 0.155* -0.719*** 0.267***  -0.204***  -0.063*** 
 0.170 0.160 0.059 0.042 0.017 0.070 0.090 0.033 0.031 0.003 
Humanities 0.042 -0.348 0.100 -0.035 -0.065 0.180* -0.148 0.050 -0.032 -0.018 
 0.120 0.230 0.076 0.040 0.035 0.070 0.090 0.033 0.023 0.010 
Social 0.175 -0.095 0.024 -0.004 -0.020 0.028 -0.057 0.019 -0.011 -0.008 
 0.100 0.100 0.027 0.006 0.021 0.030 0.030 0.011 0.007 0.004 
Science 0.065 -0.213 0.058 -0.015 -0.043 -0.030 -0.130 0.044 -0.028 -0.016 
 0.130 0.120 0.037 0.014 0.022 0.070 0.110 0.039 0.026 0.013 
Engineering 0.191*** -0.100*** 0.024***  -0.001*  -0.023** -0.057* -0.012 0.004 -0.002 -0.002 
 0.040 0.030 0.007 0.000 0.008 0.030 0.030 0.010 0.006 0.004 
Agriculture 0.214** 0.185**   -0.042*** -0.003 0.045*** -0.051 0.401***  -0.115*** 0.044*** 0.071*** 
 0.080 0.060 0.011 0.003 0.014 0.040 0.070 0.017 0.003 0.014 
Health 0.914*** -0.831*** 0.276***  -0.160***  -0.115*** 0.238*** -0.198*** 0.068***  -0.044***  -0.024*** 
 0.270 0.100 0.040 0.033 0.008 0.040 0.050 0.017 0.013 0.005 
Live_alone -0.202* - - - - -0.196*** - - - - 
 0.100 - - - - 0.040 - - - - 
Invmills - -0.615*** 0.151***  -0.012***  -0.139** - -1.100**   0.359**  -0.208**  -0.151** 
  - 0.190 0.047 0.003 0.045 - 0.460 0.149 0.088 0.061 
Const 3.081*** - - - - 0.426** - - - - 
 0.180 - - - - 0.150 - - - - 
cut1  Const - 1.407*** - - - - 1.359*** - - - 
 - 0.100 - - - - 0.220 - - - 
cut2  Const - 3.458*** - - - - 3.454*** - - - 
 - 0.090 - - - - 0.210 - - - 
Pseudo R2 0.21 0.12 - - - 0.07 0.20 - - - 
Nobs 16266 13318 - - - 17457 10966 - - - 
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A.4.6. HUNGARY 
Variables 
Men Women 
Coefficients Marginal effects Coefficients Marginal effects 
Selection 
equation 
Educat. 
mismatch 
  Under-      Properly       Over- 
educated 
Selection 
equation 
Educat. 
mismatch 
 Under-       Properly       Over- 
educated 
Demand factors           
Patents application ǂ 4.850 1.130 -0.275  -0.030* 0.306 2.913* 2.638*    -0.774* 0.140* 0.634* 
 2.843 0.598 0.147 0.015 0.161 1.336 1.027 0.305 0.058 0.249 
Youth_UR -0.034** 0.018**   -0.004***  -0.0005** 0.005** -0.007 0.008 -0.002 0.0004 0.002 
 0.011 0.006 0.001 0.0002 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.0003 0.001 
Gross fixed capital 0.379* 0.029 -0.007 -0.0008 0.008 0.332*** 0.147 -0.043  0.008* 0.035 
formation 0.181 0.041 0.011 0.001 0.012 0.054 0.075 0.022 0.004 0.018 
Expenditure/worker -0.280* -0.029 0.007 0.001 -0.008 -0.144*** -0.131** 0.038** -0.007** -0.031** 
in R&D sector ǂ 0.140 0.040 0.010 0.001 0.011 0.050 0.040 0.013 0.003 0.011 
ISCO123 among  -0.067 -0.017*   0.004* 0.0005*  -0.005* -0.047** -0.039**  0.011**  -0.002**  -0.009** 
employed 0.038 0.005 0.002 0.0002 0.002 0.016 0.014 0.004 0.0008 0.003 
Supply factors           
Age -0.052*** 0.016***  -0.004***  -0.0004** 0.004*** -0.022*** 0.004 -0.001 0.0002 0.001 
 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.0002 0.001 0.0002 0.006 0.002 0.0003 0.001 
Married -0.601*** 0.151**   -0.035** -0.007 0.042** 0.005 -0.068*** 0.020***  -0.004**  -0.016*** 
 0.057 0.057 0.012 0.004 0.016 0.035 0.020 0.006 0.002 0.004 
Index LLL 0.167* -0.316*** 0.077*** 0.008***  -0.085*** 0.166*** -0.273*** 0.080***  -0.015***  -0.066*** 
 0.066 0.031 0.008 0.002 0.009 0.043 0.048 0.014 0.003 0.011 
High level of  1.054*** 2.267***  -0.251***  -0.491*** 0.742*** 1.049*** 2.305***  -0.358***  -0.375*** 0.732*** 
education 0.085 0.132 0.011 0.023 0.030 0.056 0.271 0.024 0.045 0.068 
Medium level of 0.565*** 1.849***  -0.556*** 0.197*** 0.359*** 0.690*** 1.717***  -0.530*** 0.181*** 0.349*** 
education 0.075 0.129 0.041 0.021 0.020 0.053 0.181 0.054 0.021 0.034 
Education 0.158 -0.631*** 0.196***  -0.071***  -0.126*** 0.126 -0.764*** 0.267***  -0.137***  -0.130*** 
 0.133 0.085 0.030 0.020 0.010 0.073 0.082 0.030 0.024 0.006 
Humanities 0.202 -0.365*** 0.104***  -0.021*  -0.083*** -0.095 -0.366*** 0.121***  -0.048***  -0.073*** 
 0.173 0.078 0.024 0.010 0.014 0.083 0.054 0.020 0.012 0.008 
Social 0.067 -0.344*** 0.096***  -0.016*  -0.080*** 0.056** -0.247*** 0.076***  -0.020***  -0.056*** 
 0.050 0.060 0.019 0.007 0.012 0.019 0.035 0.011 0.004 0.007 
Science 0.134 -0.420*** 0.122***  -0.029**  -0.093*** 0.086 -0.161**  0.050**  -0.015*  -0.036** 
 0.094 0.071 0.025 0.012 0.014 0.100 0.058 0.019 0.007 0.012 
Engineering 0.151* -0.256*** 0.061*** 0.010***  -0.071*** -0.161*** -0.104 0.031 -0.007 -0.024 
 0.061 0.034 0.008 0.002 0.009 0.025 0.058 0.018 0.005 0.013 
Agriculture 0.116 0.047 -0.011 -0.002 0.013 -0.255*** 0.212 -0.057 0.001 0.056 
 0.084 0.071 0.016 0.003 0.020 0.059 0.157 0.038 0.007 0.045 
Health 0.422** -0.670*** 0.212***  -0.082**  -0.130*** 0.227*** -0.441*** 0.146***  -0.060***  -0.087*** 
 0.143 0.126 0.045 0.031 0.014 0.036 0.066 0.024 0.014 0.010 
Live_alone -0.126* - - - - -0.144*** - - - - 
 0.060 - - - - 0.030 - - - - 
Invmills - -0.286 0.069 0.008 -0.077 - 0.361 -0.106 0.019 0.087 
  - 0.198 0.047 0.006 0.053 - 0.413 0.122 0.022 0.100 
Const 3.843*** - - - - 1.331*** - - - - 
 0.616 - - - - 0.300 - - - - 
cut1  Const - 0.808*** - - - - 0.241 - - - 
 - 0.222 - - - - 0.235 - - - 
cut2  Const - 2.685*** - - - - 2.032*** - - - 
 - 0.241 - - - - 0.240 - - - 
Pseudo R2 0.21 0.15 - - - 0.13 0.12 - - - 
Nobs 22857 15446 - - - 24656 13171 - - - 
 
 37 
A.4.7. FRANCE 
Variables 
Men Women 
Coefficients Marginal effects Coefficients Marginal effects 
Selection 
equation 
Educat. 
mismatch 
  Under-      Properly       Over- 
educated 
Selection 
equation 
Educat. 
mismatch 
 Under-       Properly       Over- 
educated 
Demand factors           
Patents application 0.017 0.024 -0.010 0.007 0.002 -0.029 0.115*    -0.045** 0.025** 0.020* 
 0.030 0.032 0.013 0.010 0.003 0.032 0.045 0.018 0.010 0.008 
Youth_UR -0.013*** 0.006*    -0.002* 0.002* 0.0005* -0.017*** 0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.0002 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.001 
Gross fixed capital 0.059*** -0.022 0.009 -0.007 -0.002 0.078*** -0.069**  0.027**  -0.015**  -0.012** 
formation ǂ 0.011 0.016 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.012 0.024 0.009 0.005 0.004 
Expenditure/worker -0.066 -0.016 0.006 -0.005 -0.001 -0.070 0.053 -0.021 0.012 0.009 
in R&D sector ǂ 0.070 0.050 0.021 0.017 0.005 0.100 0.080 0.033 0.018 0.014 
ISCO123 among  -0.014*** -0.001 0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.013** 0.000 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 
employed 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.0004 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.001 
Supply factors           
Age -0.055*** -0.008*   0.003*  -0.002*  -0.001* -0.023*** -0.013*** 0.005***  -0.003***  -0.002*** 
 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.0003 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Married -0.523*** 0.153**   -0.061*** 0.047*** 0.014*** -0.037 -0.042*    0.016*  -0.009*  -0.007* 
 0.040 0.050 0.019 0.014 0.004 0.030 0.020 0.007 0.004 0.003 
Index LLL 0.088*** -0.136*** 0.054***  -0.042***  -0.012*** 0.133*** -0.128*** 0.050***  -0.028***  -0.022*** 
 0.020 0.010 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.010 0.020 0.007 0.004 0.003 
High level of  0.291** 2.736***  -0.722*** 0.108*** 0.615*** 0.463*** 2.093***  -0.612*** 0.073*** 0.539*** 
education 0.090 0.060 0.007 0.014 0.018 0.070 0.110 0.018 0.016 0.032 
Medium level of 0.143 2.204***  -0.725*** 0.433*** 0.292*** 0.300*** 1.949***  -0.632*** 0.205*** 0.426*** 
education 0.070 0.070 0.014 0.008 0.011 0.040 0.070 0.014 0.007 0.018 
Education 0.110 -0.397*** 0.156***  -0.131***  -0.025*** 0.171* -0.327*** 0.130***  -0.085***  -0.045*** 
 0.120 0.050 0.019 0.017 0.002 0.080 0.050 0.021 0.015 0.006 
Humanities -0.025 -0.170*   0.068*  -0.055**  -0.013* -0.031 -0.151**  0.059***  -0.036**  -0.024*** 
 0.090 0.070 0.026 0.022 0.004 0.060 0.050 0.019 0.012 0.007 
Social 0.055 -0.206*** 0.082***  -0.066***  -0.016*** 0.127** -0.089 0.035 -0.020 -0.015 
 0.080 0.040 0.016 0.013 0.003 0.040 0.050 0.020 0.012 0.008 
Science 0.030 -0.212*** 0.084***  -0.069***  -0.016*** 0.070 -0.179*   0.071 -0.043  -0.027* 
 0.090 0.050 0.022 0.018 0.003 0.040 0.080 0.034 0.022 0.011 
Engineering 0.165* -0.135*** 0.054***  -0.042***  -0.011*** -0.082 -0.058 0.023 -0.013 -0.009 
 0.070 0.040 0.015 0.012 0.003 0.050 0.050 0.022 0.013 0.009 
Agriculture 0.560*** 0.101*    -0.040* 0.030* 0.010 0.225** -0.066 0.026 -0.015 -0.011 
 0.100 0.050 0.019 0.014 0.005 0.090 0.050 0.022 0.013 0.009 
Health 0.436*** -0.655*** 0.248***  -0.214***  -0.034*** 0.342*** -0.392*** 0.155***  -0.101***  -0.055*** 
 0.100 0.060 0.021 0.020 0.002 0.050 0.060 0.023 0.017 0.006 
Live_alone -0.168*** - - - - 0.088*** - - - - 
 0.030 - - - - 0.020 - - - - 
Invmills - -0.249 0.099 -0.077 -0.022 - -0.185 0.072 -0.041 -0.031 
  - 0.220 0.088 0.069 0.019 - 0.290 0.115 0.065 0.050 
Const 3.606*** - - - - 1.444*** - - - - 
 0.210 - - - - 0.100 - - - - 
cut1  Const - 1.108*** - - - - 0.147 - - - 
 - 0.160 - - - - 0.120 - - - 
cut2  Const - 2.887*** - - - - 1.665*** - - - 
 - 0.170 - - - - 0.120 - - - 
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.27 - - - 0.08 0.22 - - - 
Nobs 81761 62972 - - - 88197 55434 - - - 
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A.4.8. GERMANY 
Variables 
Men Women 
Coefficients Marginal effects Coefficients Marginal effects 
Selection 
equation 
Educat. 
mismatch 
  Under-      Properly        Over- 
educated 
Selection 
equation 
Educat. 
mismatch 
  Under-       Properly        Over- 
educated 
Demand factors           
Patents application 0.056* -0.052*** 0.010***  -0.003***  -0.007*** 0.054* -0.078*** 0.019***  -0.012***  -0.007*** 
 0.022 0.013 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.023 0.022 0.005 0.003 0.002 
Youth_UR -0.040*** 0.011*    -0.002* 0.0007* 0.001* -0.008* 0.014*    -0.003* 0.002* 0.001* 
 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.0003 0.001 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Gross fixed capital 0.009 0.021 -0.004 0.001 0.003 0.035* 0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.0004 
formation ǂ 0.013 0.010 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.014 0.013 0.003 0.002 0.001* 
Expenditure/worker 0.014*** -0.010*   0.002**  -0.001**  -0.001** 0.003 -0.011*   0.003*  -0.002* -0.001* 
in R&D sector ǂ 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.0002 0.0005 0.0003 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.0005 
ISCO123 among  0.014*** -0.010*   0.002**  -0.001**  -0.001** 0.003 -0.011*   0.003*  -0.002* -0.001* 
employed 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.0002 0.0005 0.0003 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.0005 
Supply factors           
Age -0.046*** 0.009***  -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.031*** 0.017***  -0.004*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 
 0.001 0.002 0.0005 0.0001 0.0003 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.000 
Married -0.488*** -0.055 0.011 -0.004 -0.007 0.085 -0.209*** 0.053***  -0.036***  -0.017*** 
 0.027 0.040 0.008 0.003 0.005 0.051 0.023 0.006 0.005 0.002 
Index LLL 0.052*** -0.155*** 0.031***  -0.010***  -0.021*** 0.083*** -0.202*** 0.048***  -0.030***  -0.018*** 
 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.002 
High level of  0.383*** 3.104***  -0.421***  -0.314*** 0.735*** 0.446*** 3.287***  -0.406***  -0.371***  0.777*** 
education 0.045 0.087 0.011 0.010 0.015 0.056 0.113 0.011 0.014 0.018 
Medium level of -0.024 1.430***  -0.307*** 0.111*** 0.196*** 0.139*** 1.808***  -0.471*** 0.303*** 0.168*** 
education 0.035 0.060 0.014 0.009 0.009 0.023 0.083 0.019 0.020 0.008 
Education 0.469*** -0.606*** 0.161***  -0.108***  -0.053*** 0.384*** -0.663*** 0.201***  -0.164***  -0.037*** 
 0.049 0.056 0.018 0.015 0.004 0.020 0.061 0.021 0.019 0.004 
Humanities 0.407*** 0.083 -0.016 0.004 0.012 0.146*** -0.194*** 0.051***  -0.036***  -0.015*** 
 0.066 0.055 0.010 0.002 0.008 0.016 0.051 0.014 0.010 0.004 
Social 0.535*** -0.080 0.016 -0.006 -0.010 0.318*** 0.072 0.017 -0.011 -0.006 
 0.045 0.045 0.009 0.004 0.006 0.017 0.053 0.013 0.008 0.005 
Science 0.468*** -0.119*   0.025* -0.011  -0.015* 0.204*** -0.223*** 0.059**  -0.043**  -0.016*** 
 0.044 0.058 0.013 0.006 0.007 0.034 0.068 0.019 0.016 0.004 
Engineering 0.359*** 0.260***  -0.051*** 0.016*** 0.036*** 0.149*** 0.049 -0.011 0.007 0.005 
 0.041 0.038 0.008 0.003 0.005 0.021 0.034 0.008 0.005 0.003 
Agriculture 0.532*** 0.392***  -0.062*** -0.006 0.068*** 0.106* 0.151**   -0.034** 0.018*** 0.015** 
 0.092 0.060 0.008 0.005 0.013 0.055 0.055 0.011 0.005 0.006 
Health 0.738*** -0.268*** 0.061***  -0.032***  -0.030*** 0.434*** -0.103 0.025 -0.017 -0.009 
 0.041 0.062 0.015 0.010 0.006 0.017 0.072 0.018 0.013 0.006 
Live_alone -0.129*** - - - - 0.067* - - - - 
 0.027 - - - - 0.030 - - - - 
Invmills - -0.087 0.017 -0.006 -0.012 - -0.831*** 0.199***  -0.125***  -0.075*** 
 - -0.11 0.021 0.007 0.014 - 0.236 0.055 0.034 0.022 
Const 2.299*** - - - - 0.953*** - - - - 
 0.13 - - - - 0.141 - - - - 
cut1  Const - 0.616*** - - - - 0.317 - - - 
 - -0.14 - - - - 0.221 - - - 
cut2  Const - 3.269*** - - - - 3.059*** - - - 
 - -0.12 - - - - 0.241 - - - 
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.29 - - - 0.11 0.32 - - - 
Nobs 77779 58328 - - - 79850 49028 - - - 
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A.4.9. FINLAND 
Variables 
Men Women 
Coefficients Marginal effects Coefficients Marginal effects 
Selection 
equation 
Educat. 
mismatch 
  Under-      Properly       Over- 
educated 
Selection 
equation 
Educat. 
mismatch 
  Under-       Properly       Over- 
educated 
Demand factors           
Patents application ǂ -0.162*** 0.038**   -0.011** 0.011** 0.0001** -0.178*** 0.155*    -0.052* 0.049* 0.003 
 0.0003 0.013 0.004 0.004 0.0000 0.003 0.074 0.024 0.023 0.002 
Youth_UR -0.070*** 0.010 -0.003 0.003 0.0001 -0.049*** 0.039 -0.013 0.012 0.001 
 0.001 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.0001 0.001 0.021 0.007 0.006 0.0004 
Gross fixed capital 0.162*** 0.049***  -0.015*** 0.014*** 0.0002*** 0.169*** -0.123 0.041 -0.039 -0.002 
formation 0.003 0.015 0.005 0.005 0.0001 0.003 0.074 0.024 0.023 0.001 
Expenditure/worker -0.540*** 0.128*** -0.038** 0.037** 0.0004** -0.597*** 0.517* -0.173* 0.164* 0.009 
in R&D sector ǂ 0.010 0.040 0.013 0.013 0.0002 0.010 0.250 0.081 0.076 0.005 
ISCO123 among  -0.043*** -0.018*** 0.005***  -0.005*** -0.001*** -0.020*** -0.001 0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0001 
employed 0.0004 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.0000 0.0005 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.0001 
Supply factors           
Age -0.045*** 0.007 -0.002 0.002 0.0001 -0.014*** 0.014*    -0.005*  0.004* 0.0002 
 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.0000 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.0001 
Married -0.542*** 0.092*    -0.028* 0.027* 0.0003 -0.09 0.064*    -0.022*  0.020* 0.001* 
 0.01 0.050 0.014 0.014 0.0002 0.058 0.026 0.009 0.008 0.001 
Index LLL 0.093*** -0.227*** 0.067***  -0.066***  -0.001*** 0.151*** -0.285*** 0.095***  -0.090***  -0.005** 
 0.01 0.030 0.008 0.008 0.0002 0.009 0.080 0.025 0.023 0.002 
High level of  0.275*** 6.747***  -0.999*** 0.073*** 0.925*** 0.509*** 6.605***  -0.999*** 0.090*** 0.909*** 
education 0.06 0.130 0.000 0.011 0.011 0.1 0.350 0.001 0.027 0.028 
Medium level of  -0.068* 6.117***  -0.994*** 0.403*** 0.591*** 0.288*** 6.131***  -0.998*** 0.124*** 0.873*** 
education 0.03 0.120 0.001 0.021 0.022 0.08 0.250 0.001 0.022 0.023 
Education 0.412 0.267*   -0.087 0.085 0.001 -0.023 -0.300**  0.091**  -0.087**  -0.004*** 
 0.25 0.130 0.047 0.046 0.001 0.06 0.100 0.029 0.028 0.001 
Humanities -0.003 0.338***  -0.112*** 0.110*** 0.002*** -0.148 0.017 -0.006 0.005 0.000 
 0.1 0.040 0.017 0.016 0.000 0.12 0.080 0.028 0.027 0.002 
Social 0.255* 0.557***  -0.189*** 0.185*** 0.004*** 0.111 0.097***  -0.033*** 0.031** 0.002*** 
 0.1 0.020 0.010 0.009 0.000 0.06 0.030 0.010 0.010 0.000 
Science 0.434*** 0.318***  -0.104** 0.103** 0.002** -0.081 -0.200 0.063 -0.060  -0.003* 
 0.11 0.100 0.034 0.033 0.001 0.1 0.150 0.045 0.043 0.001 
Engineering 0.324*** 0.435***  -0.131*** 0.129*** 0.002*** -0.081 -0.010 0.003 -0.003 0.000 
 0.04 0.020 0.009 0.009 0.000 0.06 0.050 0.018 0.017 0.001 
Agriculture 0.469*** 0.615***  -0.214*** 0.209*** 0.005*** -0.102** 0.258***  -0.092*** 0.086*** 0.006*** 
 0.05 0.040 0.016 0.015 0.001 0.03 0.050 0.018 0.016 0.002 
Health 0.654*** 0.342***  -0.113*** 0.111*** 0.002*** 0.151** -0.108*** 0.035***  -0.034***  -0.002*** 
 0.16 0.080 0.027 0.026 0.001 0.05 0.020 0.007 0.007 0.000 
Live_alone na - - - - na - - - - 
 - - - - - - - - - - 
Invmills - -0.173 0.051 -0.051 -0.001 - -1.489 0.497 -0.472 -0.026 
 - 0.370 0.108 0.107 0.001 - 1.070 0.355 0.335 0.021 
Const 5.203*** - - - - 1.905*** - - - - 
 0.08 - - - - 0.08 - - - - 
cut1  Const - 5.930*** - - - - 5.663*** - - - 
 - 0.3 - - - - 0.11 - - - 
cut2  Const - 8.244*** - - - - 7.574*** - - - 
 - 0.29 - - - - 0.14 - - - 
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.32 - - - 0.08 0.24 - - - 
Nobs 11031 8146 - - - 11489 7968 - - - 
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A.4.10. UNITED KINGDOM 
Variables 
Men Women 
Coefficients Marginal effects Coefficients Marginal effects 
Selection 
equation 
Educat. 
mismatch 
  Under-      Properly       Over- 
educated 
Selection 
equation 
Educat. 
mismatch 
 Under-       Properly       Over- 
educated 
Demand factors           
Patents application ǂ 0.185** -0.070 0.027 -0.009 -0.018 0.071 0.146***  -0.058*** 0.017*** 0.041*** 
 0.062 0.037 0.014 0.005 0.010 0.039 0.033 0.017 0.004 0.009 
Youth_UR -0.007 -0.004 0.001 -0.0005 -0.001 -0.016** -0.025*** 0.010***  -0.003***  -0.007*** 
 0.011 0.004 0.002 0.0006 0.001 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.001 0.002 
Gross fixed capital -0.016 0.003 -0.001 0.0003 0.0005 -0.002 -0.005 0.002 -0.006 -0.001 
formation 0.015 0.003 0.001 0.0004 0.0008 0.004 0.008 0.003 0.0009 0.002 
Expenditure/worker -0.003 -0.035 0.013 -0.004 -0.009 0.011 0.033 -0.013 0.004 0.009 
in R&D sector ǂ 0.050 0.020 0.009 0.003 0.006 0.030 0.020 0.007 0.002 0.005 
ISCO123 among  0.004 -0.002*   0.0008* -0.0003* -0.0005* -0.001** -0.003*** 0.0014*** -0.0004***  -0.0009*** 
employed 0.002 0.001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002 0.0005 0.001 0.0004 0.0001 0.0003 
Supply factors           
Age -0.037*** 0.005***  -0.002*** 0.0006*** 0.001*** -0.015*** -0.024*** 0.009***  -0.003***  -0.007*** 
 0.002 0.001 0.0006 0.0002 0.0004 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.0009 
Married -0.476*** 0.042*   -0.016* 0.005* 0.011* -0.070 -0.170*** 0.067***  -0.022***  -0.045*** 
 0.034 0.020 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.047 0.023 0.009 0.0035 0.006 
Index LLL na na na na na na na na na na 
 - - - - - - - - - - 
High level of  0.575*** 0.468***  -0.174*** 0.042*** 0.131*** 0.859*** 2.295***  -0.665***  -0.045*** 0.710*** 
education 0.068 0.066 0.024 0.003 0.021 0.082 0.233 0.040 0.018 0.058 
Medium level of 0.386*** 0.587***  -0.219*** 0.058*** 0.161*** 0.597*** 2.115***  -0.630***  -0.037*** 0.666*** 
education 0.041 0.086 0.031 0.005 0.026 0.039 0.207 0.039 0.018 0.056 
Education -0.170 -0.001 0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.169* 0.106 -0.041 0.010 0.031 
 0.088 0.067 0.026 0.009 0.017 0.071 0.077 0.030 0.006 0.023 
Humanities 0.020 0.312***  -0.114*** 0.023*** 0.091*** -0.025 -0.135*   0.053 -0.018 -0.036 
 0.073 0.044 0.015 0.002 0.014 0.035 0.057 0.023 0.008 0.015 
Social 0.040 0.152***  -0.057*** 0.016*** 0.042*** 0.069 0.137**   -0.053** 0.013*** 0.040** 
 0.044 0.038 0.014 0.003 0.011 0.038 0.046 0.018 0.004 0.014 
Science -0.140** 0.202***  -0.075*** 0.019*** 0.056*** -0.079 -0.176*** 0.070***  -0.024***  -0.046*** 
 0.050 0.051 0.018 0.003 0.015 0.045 0.046 0.018 0.007 0.011 
Engineering 0.120** 0.475***  -0.173*** 0.035*** 0.138*** 0.056 0.196*    -0.075* 0.016*** 0.059* 
 0.037 0.030 0.010 0.002 0.009 0.085 0.092 0.034 0.005 0.030 
Agriculture 0.020 0.976***  -0.290***  -0.051*** 0.341*** -0.189 -0.400**  0.159**  -0.066*  -0.093*** 
 0.143 0.074 0.015 0.014 0.029 0.160 0.141 0.055 0.029 0.026 
Health 0.151* -0.076 0.030 -0.011 -0.019 0.146* 0.116*    -0.045* 0.012* 0.034 
 0.075 0.056 0.022 0.008 0.013 0.062 0.058 0.022 0.005 0.017 
Live_alone -0.289*** - - - - 0.020 - - - - 
 0.032 - - - - 0.032 - - - - 
Invmills - 0.319**   -0.123*** 0.040*** 0.083*** - 4.633*** -1.819*** 0.526*** 1.293*** 
  - 0.110 0.043 0.013 0.029 - 0.526 0.208 0.061 0.149 
Const 2.463*** - - - - 1.007*** - - - - 
 0.235 - - - - 0.121 - - - - 
cut1  Const - 0.415**  - - - - 1.961*** - - - 
 - 0.131 - - - - 0.205 - - - 
cut2  Const - 1.609*** - - - - 2.985*** - - - 
 - 0.111 - - - - 0.197 - - - 
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.05 - - - 0.09 0.03 - - - 
Nobs 32266 26603 - - - 35529 24115 - - - 
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Note: * p<0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p<0.001; Standard errors in italic.  
ǂ The sign marks those variables which have been used interchangeably. The remaining coefficients reported in the table refer to the estimates without Expenditure per worker in 
R&D sector, all other variables being included.  
Source: own calculation using EU-LFS 2003. 
 
Table A.5. Ordered probit estimates (without correcting for sample selection), selected countries 
 
Variables 
PORTUGAL FINLAND HUNGARY FRANCE GERMANY 
Under- Properly Over- Under- Properly Over- Under- Properly Over- Under- Properly Over- Under- Properly Over- 
educated educated educated educated educated 
Men      
Small firm  -0.024***  -0.009*** 0.033*** -0.041 0.040 0.000  -0.015**  -0.002* 0.017*  -0.027* 0.021** 0.006*  -0.031*** 0.008*** 0.023*** 
 
0.006 0.002 0.008 0.023 0.023 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.006 0.011 0.008 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 
Part-time worker 0.008 0.002 -0.010 0.016 -0.016 0.000 -0.024 -0.005 0.029 -0.019 0.015 0.004 0.076***  -0.041***  -0.035*** 
 
0.013 0.002 0.016 0.020 0.020 0.000 0.018 0.006 0.024 0.016 0.013 0.004 0.011 0.008 0.003 
Temporary contract -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.059***  -0.059***  -0.001***  -0.047***  -0.015*** 0.062***  -0.059*** 0.045*** 0.015*** 0.086***  -0.048***  -0.038*** 
 
0.007 0.002 0.009 0.014 0.014 0.000 0.005 0.004 0.009 0.017 0.012 0.004 0.012 0.009 0.003 
Mover 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 -0.009 0.000 0.013 0.001** -0.014 0.068***  -0.055***  -0.013*** -0.004 0.002 0.003 
 
0.013 0.004 0.018 0.029 0.028 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.011 0.013 0.010 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.004 
 
PORTUGAL FINLAND HUNGARY FRANCE GREECE 
Under- Properly Over- Under- Properly Over- Under- Properly Over- Under- Properly Over- Under- Properly Over- 
educated educated educated educated educated 
Women      
Small firm -0.023 -0.006 0.029  -0.052*** 0.049*** 0.003***  -0.049*** 0.007*** 0.041***  -0.060*** 0.034*** 0.027*** -0.021 0.007 0.014 
 
0.012 0.004 0.016 0.011 0.011 0.001 0.012 0.002 0.011 0.010 0.005 0.004 0.014 0.004 0.010 
Part-time worker 0.008 0.001 -0.009  -0.039*** 0.037***  0.002***  -0.051*** 0.003 0.048**  -0.096*** 0.051*** 0.045***  -0.100*** 0.010 0.091*** 
 
0.009 0.001 0.011 0.008 0.007 0.000 0.015 0.002 0.017 0.013 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.010 
Temporary contract -0.015 -0.004 0.019 0.016 -0.016 -0.001  -0.056*** 0.002 0.054*** -0.002 0.001 0.001  -0.038* 0.010*** 0.028* 
 
0.011 0.004 0.015 0.019 0.018 0.001 0.009 0.002 0.011 0.010 0.005 0.004 0.016 0.002 0.014 
Mover 0.140***  -0.048*  -0.092*** 0.022 -0.021 -0.001 0.017 -0.004 -0.013 0.075***  -0.047**  -0.028*** 0.037 -0.015 -0.023 
 
0.032 0.020 0.013 0.051 0.048 0.002 0.028 0.007 0.021 0.022 0.015 0.007 0.063 0.029 0.034 
Note: The estimates without sample selection are provided only for those countries where it has not been found (either for men or women, or both). Here we report the coefficients 
for additional variables, but the specification includes also all the variables as in Table A.4 (except for the instrumental variables). 
Source: own calculation using EU-LFS 2003.
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Table A.6. Some characteristics of educational systems and labour market outcomes 
Countries Accessibility of education Field of highest 
level of education 
or training 
successfully 
completed: 
% of Engineering, 
manufacturing 
and construction 
(d) 
Dual 
system of  
education 
PISA 
Scores 
2003 
Youth 
unemployment 
rate, 15-24 
years old, 2003 
(e) 
Average duration of 
school-to-work 
transition in Europe, 
1994-2000, (months) 
(b) 
Private returns to education 
% Public 
University 
(a) 
Tuitions in 
public 
universities (a,c) 
Availability 
of State 
support 
(a,c) 
Time 
spent to 
find any 
job 
Time spent 
to find a 
permanent 
job 
Return to upper-
secondary 
education, males 
and females (c) 
Return to tertiary 
education, males 
and females (c) 
CZ 27 public 
universities, 
40 private 
colleges 
Free* Low 49.04 No 511 18.6 19.9 - 15.0/15.2 29.1/23.8 
FI All Free High 30.19 Partially 546 21.8 27.6 44.3 10.2/7.9 10.7/9.3 
FR 77 out of 97 Low Low 30.10 Partially 509 19.1 24.3 40.7 6.1/5.6 8.4/7.4 
DE 248 out of 331 Free/low 
depending on 
Länder 
Low 34.28 Yes 503 11.0 18.0 33.8 7.0/8.1 8.0/4.8 
EL All Free for 
Greek citizens 
Low 12.75 No 462 26.8 21.3 51.5 - - 
ES 52 out of 74 Low Low 14.73 No 484 22.7 34.6 56.6 9.5/10.2 7.6/8.7 
HU 17 state-
universities, 
16 colleges, 
26 religious 
colleges, 
6 private-
foundations 
Low High 43.35 No 494 13.4 30.2 - 8.6/8.4 19.8/13.8 
IT 72 out of 86 Low Low 17.73 No 474 27.1 25.5 44.8 - - 
PT 13 out of 22 Medium Low 1.69 No 470 14.5 22.6 51.5 13.1/12.3 23.9/21.5 
UK All, except for  
the University 
of Buckingham 
High High 23.24 No 511 12.3 19.4 36.1 18.0/18.5 14.3/14.5 
Note: * High for courses in English language. Data for CZ and HU refer to 2000. 
Source: (a) National data, (b) Quintini et al. (2007), (c) OECD 2008. Data referring to 2004, (d) EU-LFS 2003, (e) Eurostat website. 
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B. Technical Appendix 
Here we test the quality and the validity of the instrumental variables used in the empirical analysis (Live_alone or 
Young_children dummies). 
Instrumental quality is ensured if there is a strong correlation between the instrument and the employment probability. A 
statistic commonly used in order to test this condition (Bound et al., 1995) is the R2 of the first stage regression with the 
included instrument “partialled-out”, or Shea partial R2 (for an application to the analysis of overeducation see e.g. Di Pietro 
and Cutillo, 2006b). In our first stage regressions the partial R2 on the excluded instruments range from 9% to 6% for the 
variable Live_alone and from 13% to 8% for the variable Young_children, suggesting that both instruments make a relevant 
contribution to explaining labour market participation (see table B1).  
Instrumental validity is ensured if the instrument can be legitimately excluded from the overeducation equation. This 
assumption is often checked through the Sargan test. Nevertheless, this test is valid only in case of over-identification (i.e. the 
number of valid instruments exceeds the number of endogenous variables), which is not our case. Indeed, having young 
children or living alone do not have the same impact on labour market participation (and on overeducation risks) in all 
countries. Then, we decided not to use both variables as instruments for all countries, but we choose the better instrument case 
by case. Following the suggestion of Cutillo and Ceccarelli (2010), we checked the validity of the instruments by using the 
approach proposed by Dolton and Vignoles (2002). According to these authors, a valid instrument must be uncorrelated with 
the error term of the outcome equation, and thus it should not affect the risk of overeducation conditional on the included 
explanatory variables. When the residuals from the overeducation equations were regressed on the instrument, we obtained R2 
ranging from 0.0009 to 0.0001 (Live_alone) and from 0.0006 to 0.0004 (Young_children) as in Table B.1. This indicates that 
both instruments do not explain any significant variation in the residual variability and hence are valid. 
 
Table B.1 – Tests on the quality and the validity of the instruments 
Country and selection variable Test Test results 
Men Women 
ITALY – Live_alone 
Partial R
2
 0.0921 0.0877 
Dolton-Vignoles 0.0003 0.0001 
GREECE –  Young_children 
Partial R
2
 0.1330 0.0807 
Dolton-Vignoles 0.0005        0.0006 
PORTUGAL –  Young_children 
Partial R
2
 0.1232 0.0767 
Dolton-Vignoles 0.0004 0.0005 
SPAIN – Live_alone 
Partial R
2
 0.0960 0.0645 
Dolton-Vignoles 0.0001 0.0002 
CZECH REPUBLIC – Live_alone 
Partial R
2
 0.0589 0.0601 
Dolton-Vignoles        0.0003 0.0009 
HUNGARY – Live_alone 
Partial R
2
 0.0866 0.0657 
Dolton-Vignoles 0.0001 0.0002 
FRANCE – Live_alone 
Partial R
2
 0.0617 0.0781 
Dolton-Vignoles 0.0008 0.0001 
GERMANY – Live_alone 
Partial R
2
 0.0744 0.0631 
Dolton-Vignoles 0.0007        0.0002 
UNITED KINGDOM – Live_alone 
Partial R
2
 0.0766 0.0616 
Dolton-Vignoles 0.0006 0.0007 
Source: own calculation. 
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